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Chapter 1
Introduction
Analyzing the causes and consequences of international trade, the traditional
international trade literature used to focus on country or industry comparative ad-
vantages, increasing returns to scale in the production process, and consumer love
of variety, but paid little attention to the unit of observation that actually drives the
observed trade flows: firms.
However, in the past fifteen years, with increasing availability of detailed micro
datasets, the focus shifted to the firm level. A very active research strand docu-
ments that despite the gigantic dimensions of international trade and foreign direct
investments (FDI) at the aggregate level, the share of firms that are in fact engaged
in international activities is surprisingly low. On average, less than five percent of
all firms export their products, and even less firms invest abroad. Though these
firm types are rare, many studies find them to perform systematically better than
purely domestic firms even before their actual foreign market entry (Bernard et al.,
2007b). These empirical regularities inspired the development of the so-called
“new, new trade models” that stress within-industry heterogeneity of firms (Melitz,
2003; Bernard et al., 2003; Helpman et al., 2004). Together, this research con-
tributed successfully to a better understanding of the selection of certain firms into
international activities and of the effects of international trade on economic perfor-
mance.
In these models, it is usually assumed that all FDI are greenfield investments,
that is, firms construct new establishments in the foreign country. However, in par-
ticular between highly developed countries, cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) of existing foreign firms are largely responsible for the recent increase
of international capital flows. Global FDI growth seems to be strongly driven by
merger waves, while greenfield investments appear to be relatively less volatile
over time. In years of merger wave peaks, cross-border M&A flows account for up
to 80% of global FDI (UNCTAD, 2010).
The results from analyses for greenfield investments and exporting cannot be
transfered directly to the case of cross-border M&A as different motives, such
as the access to complementary technology or location-specific knowledge, might
matter in the decision for this entry mode (Nocke & Yeaple, 2007). The aim of the
first three chapters of this thesis thus is to extend the literature on heterogeneous
firms and international trade with analyses of cross-border M&A as a specific form
of FDI. Based on detailed European firm-level balance sheet information combined
with a large global M&A database, the contributions provide empirical evidence
on the characteristics of participants in cross-border deals and on the effects of this
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form of international activity on the investing firms.
However, globalization is not restricted to international trade and FDI. Parallel
to these developments, the labor force became more international as well. Migra-
tion across national boundaries increased significantly. In the early nineties, 5% of
the total population of OECD countries were foreign born according to The World
Bank World Development Indicators. The share of migrants rose to 9% in 2010,
with large variations across countries. While most of the public and economic dis-
cussion is focused on the increasing presence of foreign-born on different labor
market outcomes, another important aspect is the composition of migrants. Devel-
oped countries, and in particular large cities, attract people from all over the world.
As a result, the cultural mix changes in many societies (Ottaviano & Peri, 2006).
Due to their different cultural backgrounds, international migrants bring new
knowledge, abilities, and ideas from their country of origin to the domestic econ-
omy. In addition to cultural diversity as a consumption amenity, several recent
papers could show that the interaction between diverse migrants and native people
rises cities’ or regions’ productivity levels if complementary abilities are combined
(Ottaviano & Peri, 2006; Südekum et al., 2012, among others).
In addition to cross-border acquisitions, employing a culturally diverse work-
force or a location in a diverse region can also provide firms with access to new,
complementary knowledge that might be specific for the migrants’ country of ori-
gin. The effect of the increase in cultural diversity among foreign workers, and its
impact on the performance of plants is the focus of the last chapter of this work.
The analysis is again carried out at the micro level of establishments and is com-
bined with data on the composition of the plant and region workforce.
The internationalization of firms and the relation to plant and firm performance
is the unifying theme of this doctoral thesis. The four following chapters are indi-
vidual contributions and are briefly summarized in the following.
Chapter 2, “The effects of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on the acquir-
ers’ domestic performance: firm-level evidence”, provides empirical evidence on
the effects of M&A on the investing firms’ domestic performance in the U.K. and
France. A new firm-level dataset is built up that combines a global M&A database
with balance sheet data for the years 2000 to 2007. Combining matching tech-
niques with a difference-in-differences estimator, cross-border M&A are shown
to boost on average acquirers’ domestic sales and investment, and cross-border
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deals do not appear to be accompanied by a downsizing of the domestic labor
force in neither of both countries. Further, acquisitions in knowledge-intensive in-
dustries lead to improvements in domestic productivity. The results display some
heterogeneity across industries and types of acquisitions, suggesting a connection
between the motives for international M&As and their resulting effects.
This chapter is based on a cooperation together with Dr. Joel Stiebale, Lecturer
of Industrial Economics, Nottingham University Business School. In 2011, this
work was published in the Canadian Journal of Economics, volume 44, issue 3,
pages 957–990.
Chapter 3, “Productivity and the internationalization of firms: cross-border
acquisitions versus greenfield investments”, extends the literature on the deter-
minants of international activity at the firm level towards cross-border acquisi-
tions and greenfield investments as different modes of FDI. Using a rich dataset
of British firms, multinationals (MNEs) are shown to be characterized by higher
productivity levels than exporters on average. However, the productivity ranking
predicted by Helpman et al. (2004) does not hold within all types of industries and
across all modes of foreign direct investment. In line with Nocke & Yeaple (2007)
it matters whether multinational firms engage abroad via greenfield investments or
cross-border acquisitions. Cross-border deals involve the most productive firms in
sectors with a high share of intangible assets, but the least productive group of all
internationally active firms in other industries.
This chapter is single authored. In the year 2011, it was published as Ruhr Eco-
nomic Paper No. 259, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung,
Universitäten Bochum, Dortmund, and Duisburg-Essen.
Chapter 4, “Who buys who in international trade” makes use of a newly con-
structed dataset that combines information on both European acquirer and target
firms in domestic and cross-border M&A deals with a large group of control firms
that are not involved in any acquisition activity. The direct link between the two
sides of acquisitions contributes to two research questions. First, the complete
productivity ranking of acquirer, target, and domestic firms can be described. In
contrast to previous work, the self-selection mechanism of firms into international
acquisitions and the cherry-picking of suitable target firms are analyzed simultane-
ously and for a cross-country dataset. Second, the M&A literature on “who buys
who” is extended towards cross-border acquisitions. The distribution of the perfor-
mance advantage of acquiring firms in direct comparison to their chosen targets in
4
the foreign country is analyzed. Systematic differences in the results show up for
domestic and cross-border deals.
This third chapter is again single authored. The M&A and firm data used for
the three research projects on cross-border mergers and acquisitions was kindly
provided by the Rheinisch-Westfä¨lisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung in Es-
sen.
Chapter 5, titled “Cultural diversity and plant productivity”, turns to the analy-
sis of the effects of an internationalized labor force. It extends the literature on the
effects of cultural diversity on the economic performance as it analyzes two chan-
nels through which a culturally diverse workforce can have an impact on the pro-
ductivity at the establishment level. The composition of the plants’ own workforce,
where native and non-native workers from different nations interact directly, influ-
ences plant efficiency, but the diversification of the regional workforce at the plants’
location can also generate knowledge spillovers. Complementarities in skills and
problem-solving abilities stemming from different cultural backgrounds might im-
prove the plants’ measured performance, while higher transaction costs due to
communication problems probably decrease plant efficiency. Production functions
augmented with detailed plant and region workforce information are estimated for
a comprehensive sample of German establishments. Potential endogeneity prob-
lems are addressed in a System GMM framework. We find positive impacts of
a culturally diverse region workforce in particular for small, technology-intensive
plants, and in the service sector. The diversity of the own workforce additionally
increases the productivity of large, manufacturing plants.
This chapter is based on joint work together with Dr. Jens Südekum, Professor
of Economics, University of Duisburg-Essen, and Dr. Stephan Brunow, Researcher
at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in Nürnberg. The data was kindly
provided by the Research Data Center (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency.
This research is an outcome of the research project “Migrant diversity and regional
disparities” that is part of NORFACE, a European Research Program on migration.
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Chapter 2
The effects of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions on
the acquirers’ domestic
performance: firm-level
evidence
2.1 Introduction
Increasing values of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows still cause heated debates
in most developed countries. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) con-
stitute nowadays a major share of transnational investment after having increased
sharply in the last two decades. In years of merger waves, cross-border M&A flows
amounted up to 80% of global FDI and the total value of worldwide cross-border
M&As amounted to over one trillion US dollar in 2007.1 Advocates point out pro-
ductivity improvements in firms that decide to ‘go global’. These could either stem
from cost differences between countries or from access to new technologies help-
ing firms to stay competitive. Opponents, in contrast, fear both the replacement of
jobs if firms decide to relocate production abroad, and the loss in bargaining power
of workers and sequent wage reductions due to the thread of investing abroad.
Cross-border M&As as a form of FDI started to receive more and more atten-
tion in the international trade literature only recently (see, for example, Nocke &
Yeaple, 2007, 2008; Neary, 2007; Head & Ries, 2003). Empirical evidence on the
effects of cross-border M&As is still sparse and mostly limited to the analysis of
the impact on target firms, whereas there is no empirical work explicitly dealing
with the effects on the investing enterprises.2
Analyzing the consequences of cross-border M&As on the investing firms is
important both from a theoretical as well as from an economic policy point of view.
First, recent theoretical contributions stress the importance of heterogeneity in firm
characteristics and the role of the different motives behind the choice of a particular
foreign market entry mode (Nocke & Yeaple, 2007; Norbäck & Persson, 2007). In
these models M&As are predominantly driven by the acquisition of complementary
assets and technologies, while greenfield investments do not provide direct access
to the foreign stock of knowledge and are rather undertaken to exploit existing
firm-specific assets or cross-country differences in production costs. Hence, it is
not possible to derive conclusions about the effects of cross-border M&As from
studies of aggregate FDI. Second, the few empirical M&A studies that compare the
1http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=901 (accessed
September 30, 2010)
2E.g. Girma & Görg (2004) and Bandick & Görg (2010) analyze the effects on survival
and employment in foreign acquisitions targets, and Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006);
Harris & Robinson (2003) look at productivity spillovers in target firms. Breinlich (2008)
is one study that considers both sides of a deal comparing characteristics of acquirers and
target firms, however he does not address the effects on the involved firms.
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determinants of international and domestic deals find that motives for cross-border
M&As are quite different from those of national deals (Shimizu et al., 2004), which
impedes the generalization of results found in the M&A literature.
From an economic policy point of view the research question is important as
policy makers may hope for potential productivity gains and a strengthening of
the national firms’ market position after a deal, but at the same time fear a loss
of production due to rationalization and relocation. In the case of cross-border
acquisitions, analysis of the combined entity are not sufficient to evaluate a deal,
however, as it matters from the policy maker’s perspective whether rationalization
measures and improvements in efficiency take place at the target or at the acquir-
ing firm, and thus acquisitions increase or reduce output and input demand in the
domestic or the foreign country. Moreover, most governments are quite skeptical
when it comes to foreign investors buying domestic firms, and in particular, when
it comes to industries considered as key to the countries’ technological basis. From
a global welfare perspective, the net effects of mutual restrictions on cross-border
acquisitions depend on the effects both on the acquirer and target firms involved in
a deal. An analysis of the acquirer side thus complements the existing knowledge
of the effects at the target side of cross-border acquisitions.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical investigation that explicitly
deals with the home country effects of cross-border acquisitions at the firm-level.
This work fills this gap and aims to identify the effects of cross-border M&As on
the domestic growth and productivity of the investing firm.
To provide first evidence on the effects of cross-border M&As on the acquirers’
domestic activity, we construct a unique firm-level data set that combines financial
data of firms from the United Kingdom (U.K.) and France with a global M&A
database for the years 2000-2007. Both the U.K. and France are among the top
five countries with respect to cross-border acquisitions worldwide, thus providing
enough observations for a detailed analysis. We implement matching techniques
in combination with a difference-in-differences estimator to control for selection
based on observable characteristics as well as for time-invariant unobserved firm
heterogeneity. We find that cross-border deals boost domestic sales growth on av-
erage, and they are not accompanied by a downsizing of the domestic labor force
in neither of the two countries. Further, there is some evidence that cross-border
M&As increase domestic efficiency for acquirers in industries with a high techno-
logical intensity.
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Although changes in domestic investment, sales, and employment growth vary
somewhat across industries, countries, and types of acquisitions, in no case cross-
border M&As are associated with significant reductions in domestic economic
activity. Apparently, the substitution of activity at home by cheaper production
abroad does not appear to be the main motive for cross-border M&As. Those deals
seem to either serve foreign market entry or – in particular in technology-intensive
industries – to be motivated by the possibility to access the technology and knowl-
edge stock of the foreign target firm.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, previ-
ous research on M&As and FDI is discussed, section 2.3 describes our estimation
strategy and section 2.4 provides a description of the data. Results of the empirical
analysis are presented in section 2.5 with some robustness checks in chapter 2.6;
section 2.7 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Related Literature
Several strands of literature are relevant for the effects of cross-border M&As on
the investing firm. We first look at the M&A literature that is usually focused on
domestic acquisitions. There is evidence, however, that cross-border acquisitions
differ considerably from national acquisitions. Therefore, we try to extract addi-
tional predictions from the FDI literature – although much of this literature does
not consider the particular mode of foreign market entry. Overall, theoretical pre-
dictions regarding the effects on domestic output and input demands as well as
efficiency gains after M&As depend crucially on the underlying motives that de-
termine the investment (see Shimizu et al., 2004).
Within the industrial organization literature, the main motives for M&As are
the strengthening of market power (Kamien & Zang, 1990) and the realization of
efficiency gains. Efficiency gains might stem from technology transfer within the
merged entity (Röller et al., 2001), the reallocation of production and technology to
more efficient uses (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2008), or the exploitation of comple-
mentary assets in acquirer and target firm (Jovanovic & Braguinsky, 2004). While
M&As that are conducted for purely strategic reasons will probably lead to a re-
duced output level in the merged entity due to rival firms’ business expansion, the
realization of efficiency gains might have an effect in the opposite direction.
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Yet, there are other motives for M&As related to the discussion on unprofitable
M&As that do not necessarily imply efficiency increases (Budzinski & Kretschmer,
2009). If M&As arise out of managers’ utility maximization, which may include
preferences for expansion (an ‘Empire-building’ motive, see Shleifer & Vishny,
1988), efficiency does not necessarily improve after the deal. Similarly, Jensen
(1986) points out that managers have a preference to reinvest free cash rather than
to return it to investors.
While several empirical studies find productivity effects of M&As on the com-
bined entity (see, e.g., Conyon et al., 2002b; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001), this
does not necessarily reflect efficiency gains in the acquiring firm, especially in di-
versifying acquisitions (compare Schoar, 2002).
Supposing that M&As indeed result in an improved efficiency level, a crucial
point for policy makers is the source of these improvements. Policy makers and
trade unions often argue that efficiency gains are the result of rationalization, espe-
cially of downsizing the workforce. Shleifer & Summers (1998) argue that M&As
provide an opportunity to cancel implicit contracts with trade unions or employees.
Empirical evidence regarding the employment consequences of M&As is mixed.
Harris et al. (2005) report that productivity increases after ownership changes are
at least partly due to a layoff of workers, disinvestment and outsourcing of produc-
tion stages. Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) find that on average M&As within Europe
do involve a downsizing of the labor force in the merged firm, while this is not the
case for U.S. deals. They trace the difference back to more rigid labor markets in
Europe.3
The discussion of the related literature so far has neglected the international di-
mension of M&As. Yet, the characteristics of cross-border deals are quite different
from those of national deals. Cross-border M&As are on average much larger than
national deals and more often target listed firms (Grimpe & Hussinger, 2008). They
are also associated with higher uncertainty, higher risk of failure (Bertrand & Zu-
niga, 2006; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991), and with higher (transaction) costs due
to the larger cultural distance and institutional differences (Di Giovanni, 2005).
3These cross-country differences show up in further studies. Conyon et al. (2002a)
find that after an M&A, employment shrinks in the combined firm, and Amess et al.
(2008) report negative employment adjustment at the acquired firm using a sample of
U.K. targets. In contrast, McGuckin & Nguyen (2001), among others, find that acquired
plants in the U.S. are characterized by faster employment growth after the acquisition
than other plants.
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Therefore, acquirers may require a higher expected return from cross-border ac-
quisitions than from domestic deals. Finally, Frey & Hussinger (2006) find that
technological relatedness (in terms of the patent portfolio) of acquirer and target is
a significant determinant of cross-border acquisitions, but not of domestic ones.
Cross-border acquisitions are a mode of FDI and might be motivated by the
desire to enter foreign markets, by differences in production costs across coun-
tries, or the access to country-specific assets in addition to strategic motives.4 In
most theoretical trade models incorporating firm heterogeneity, market access is
the most important motive for FDI (Helpman et al., 2004, for instance). This type
of market-seeking FDI is usually referred to as horizontal investment. On the one
hand, horizontal FDI might reduce domestic production if it comes along with a
substitution of exports. If substitution of exporting activities indeed takes place
after horizontal cross-border M&As, efficiency in the home country could be neg-
atively affected, as the firm loses economies of scale. On the other hand, FDI might
spur headquarter activities such as marketing and R&D as these investments can be
applied to a larger production output after a foreign expansion (Fors & Svensson,
2002), which might in turn increase growth in the acquirers’ home activity.
There is also scope for vertical investment activity in analogy to Head & Ries
(2003), motivated by differences in factor costs across countries. The affiliate, typ-
ically located in regions with lower labor costs, then performs part of the firm’s
production process at a lower cost, i.e. there is offshoring within the firm. While
offshoring may involve a substitution between domestic and foreign production,
this might be more than offset by a productivity increase that stems from cost sav-
ings. Along these lines, Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) argue that productiv-
ity improvements from offshoring can lead to increased demand for the remaining
domestic workers. Indeed, existing empirical evidence indicates that offshoring
can boost domestic productivity (see, for instance, Amiti & Wei, 2009; Görg et al.,
2008), while it is not necessarily associated with declining employment (Crinó,
2009; Amiti & Wei, 2005, 2006).
While the FDI literature provides some guidance to relevant motives for and
effects of cross-border investments, the motives for cross-border M&As might be
quite different from other types of FDI. In contrast to exporting and greenfield in-
4See Helpman (2006) for an overview on the theoretical literature on firms and FDI
choices.
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vestment, cross-border M&As provide access to existing products that are suitable
to and proven and tested in the foreign market. In addition, access to existing net-
works with customers and suppliers is provided (see Görg, 2000, e.g.). Theoretical
models that differentiate between the mode of foreign market entry usually argue
that FDI motivated by production cost differences rather takes the form of green-
field investments, while cross-border M&As are primarily conducted to gain ac-
cess to complementary firm-specific assets in target firms (Nocke & Yeaple, 2008),
firm-specific capabilities that are non-mobile across borders and markets (Nocke
& Yeaple, 2007), or country specific assets (Norbäck & Persson, 2007). Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that cross-border M&As are rarely associated with
input-output linkages (Hijzen et al., 2008). Hence, market access and the exploita-
tion of complementarities are probably more important for cross-border M&As
than differences in the costs of production factors. In case of technology-driven
cross-border M&As, the acquirer’s productivity can be expected to rise due to the
acquired complementary knowledge.
Nevertheless, cross-border acquisitions might also be motivated by purely strate-
gic reasons (see, for instance, Horn & Persson, 2001; Neary, 2007). Efficiency
differences between firms might be more pronounced across than within coun-
tries. These can induce firms to engage in cross-border M&As (see, e.g., Bjorvatn,
2004; Neary, 2007; Bertrand & Zitouna, 2006). As argued by Neary (2007), these
cross-border acquisitions can lead to a reallocation of production from less effi-
cient foreign target firms to more efficient acquirers. Hence, for M&As induced by
efficiency differences between firms across countries, we would expect an increase
in production and employment in acquiring firms.
Several empirical contributions analyze the effects of FDI on the productivity
of multinational firms and accompanying substitution of domestic investment and
labor without taking into account the different modes of foreign entry.5 The results
from these studies are mixed, especially regarding the question of whether FDI
is a substitute for or complementary to domestic activity. The differences in the
results may partly stem from institutional differences and distinct industry struc-
tures across countries and from a mixture of the extensive and the intensive margin
5See for example Pfaffermayr (2004), Becker & Mündler (2010), Konings & Murphy
(2006), or Becker & Mündler (2008) on employment; Navaretti & Castellani (2004), Jäckle
& Wamser (2010) or Damijan et al. (2007) for productivity, Fors & Svensson (2002) for
R&D, and Desai et al. (2009) for investment.
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of FDI. In addition, neglecting heterogeneity in the composition of FDI makes it
impossible to derive the effects of cross-border acquisitions.
Concluding, as the theoretical literature does not predict unambiguous effects,
the issue whether cross-border acquirers substitute domestic activity and can real-
ize efficiency gains boils down to an empirical question. The empirical literature,
however, either deals with national deals or looks at FDI flows in the aggregate,
and the effect of cross-border acquisitions on the acquirers is still an open ques-
tion. With this chapter, we aim to provide first evidence.
2.3 Estimation
Our empirical strategy aims to identify the causal impact of cross-border M&As
on the performance of the acquiring firm. We employ a propensity score match-
ing procedure combined with a difference-in-differences estimator. This empirical
strategy is prominent in labor market evaluation studies (see Heckman et al., 1997,
as an example) and became popular in the international trade literature, where Wag-
ner (2002), among others, started to address the impact of exporting on productivity
and firm size using a similar methodology.6
The evaluation of a treatment effect on the treated s periods after treatment at
time t comprises a comparison between the actual outcome and the situation had
the firm not invested abroad.
τATT = E[y
1
t+s|Xt−1, CBt = 1]− E[y0t+s|Xt−1, CBt = 1], (2.1)
where y1 is the outcome of an acquirer, y0 the outcome of the acquirer had it not
invested abroad,X contains a set of control variables, and CB is a binary indicator
of cross-border M&A activity taking the value one if the firm acquires at least one
foreign target in the respective year.
As the counterfactual situation E[y0t+s|Xt−1, CBt = 1] is not observable, the
evaluation problem is often framed as a missing data problem. The main task is
to construct a consistent estimate for the average outcome of acquirers had they
not invested abroad. The average outcome of the non-acquirers does not provide
a good estimate of the counterfactual in non-experimental settings as firms select
6See Girma & Görg (2007), Greenaway & Kneller (2008), and Yasar & Rejesus (2005)
for further applications of the matching estimator to research questions regarding the
effects of exporting and FDI.
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themselves into the different groups based on characteristics that might also influ-
ence the measured outcome. We use matching techniques to construct a compari-
son group. The goal of the matching procedure is to identify matches of acquirers
and non-acquirers that are similar to each other with respect to a range of ob-
servable characteristics. The expected outcome of this comparison group provides
a valid construction of the counterfactual outcome under the conditional indepen-
dence assumption. The conditional independence assumption requires the potential
outcome to be independent of the treatment assignment given the set of observable
control variables that are not influenced by the treatment:
y1, y0 ⊥ CB|X. (2.2)
That is, we assume that selection into treatment is based on observable characteris-
tics only, i.e. unobservable variables do not influence simultaneously the treatment
assignment and the outcome variables. This assumption is not testable, but the in-
clusion of a wide range of covariates that are suggested by theory helps to justify
the validity of the approach (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).
The number of relevant variables to be included is large, hence we take ad-
vantage of Rosenbaum & Rubin’s (1983) results: if the conditional independence
holds conditional on X , it will also be true for the balancing score. We implement
a logit estimation and use the predicted probability of a cross-border deal as the
balancing propensity score:
Pˆ (CBt = 1|Xt−1) = Λ(βˆXt−1), (2.3)
where Λ is the cumulative logistic probability function. The matrix Xt−1 contains
only pre-deal characteristics from period t− 1 to avoid reverse causality problems
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The best match is a firm not active in cross-border
M&As with the propensity score that is closest to the acquirer’s score.
As our dataset is a panel, we can release the strong assumption of selection on
observables by combining the matching technique with a difference-in-differences
estimator (Blundell & Costa Dias, 2000). Instead of comparing differences in the
levels of the outcome variables between the two groups we focus on log growth
rates. This procedure allows the decision to engage in a cross-border acquisition
to be based on the expected returns to this investment and on time-invariant un-
observables (Heckman et al., 1997). Still, unobserved time-varying factors that
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influence both treatment and outcome variables as well as differential reactions to
common macroeconomic shocks across treatment and control group would lead to
inconsistent results.
The difference-in-differences estimator for the effect of cross-border acquisi-
tions can be expressed as follows:
τˆDID = E[y
1
t+s−y1t−1|Xt−1, CBt = 1]−E[y0t+s−y0t−1|Xt−1, CBt = 0], (2.4)
which can be operationalized applying regression analysis to the matched data
set with log growth rates as the dependent variable and a dummy for cross-border
deals:
∆yi,t+s = α+ βCBit + εit. (2.5)
The difference-in-difference estimate τˆDID is then given by the estimated co-
efficient βˆ in an OLS regression. This representation makes the analysis of het-
erogeneous effects across industries straightforward testing for equality of the βˆk
using the following estimation equation:
∆yi,t+s = α1indi1 + · · ·+ αKindiK
+ β1CBit × indi1 + · · ·+ βKCBit × indiK + εit. (2.6)
with indk, k = 1, . . . ,K dummy variables for the K sectors to be considered.
The second assumption for the validity of the matching procedure, the overlap
condition, requires for each set of Xt−1 of all treated and control firms a positive
probability to be involved in a cross-border deal as well as a positive probability
not to be involved:
0 < P (CBt = 1|Xt−1) < 1. (2.7)
This guarantees that a suitable match for each acquirer is in principle available
and no perfect prediction based onXt−1 is possible. This assumption is less critical
in the present case, as the share of acquirers in cross-border deals is small and the
pool of potential matches is quite extensive. The results presented are based on es-
timations where the common support condition is imposed, acquirers off common
support are not included.7 Furthermore, one has to decide whether the matching
7Only six French and two British firms are off common support (table 2.4).
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procedure is carried out with or without replacement. Basically, this choice in-
volves a trade-off between bias and variance. We decide to perform the propensity
score matching with replacement, as in the British sample the balancing quality is
reduced considerably in the version without replacement. Therefore, we calculate
the variance of the matching estimator with a correction for matching estimators
with replacement as suggested by Lechner (2001) to account for the repeated use
of several matches.8
One potential concern with the propensity score estimation is that the decisions
of firms in our comparison group might be affected by the acquirers’ decision to
invest abroad. Our approach is valid only if the stable unit treatment assumption
holds, i.e. if there are no significant general equilibrium effects. If acquirers ham-
per domestic growth of competitors in the comparison group due to strategic inter-
action, our results might overestimate the effect of cross-border M&As. For this to
happen, however, firms would have to be direct competitors in a market, i.e. only
if the demand for the acquirers’ products directly affects the non-acquirers’ market
position. The substitutability of products within two-digit industries – which we
use in the estimation of the propensity score – is probably limited. This clearly
reduces the risk of overestimation. In addition, the problem is probably even less
severe in our application as only a small fraction of firms engages in cross-border
M&As and hence average interaction effects are probably small as well (Caliendo
& Kopeinig, 2008).
2.4 Data and Model Specification
2.4.1 Data
We compile a unique firm-level data set that combines financial data for European
firms with a global M&A database covering the years 2000-2007. The financial
data is taken from the Amadeus database published by Bureau van Dijk, which
provides information on firms’ balance sheet and profit and loss accounts for up to
ten years. The data is collected from company reports which are supplemented by
specialized regional information providers. Amadeus has been used in numerous
empirical studies on FDI (see Helpman et al., 2004; Budd et al., 2005, as exam-
8The propensity-score matching and covariate balance testing is carried out using Leu-
ven & Sianesi’s (2003) software psmatch2 in STATAR©10.
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ples). Combining several updates of the Amadeus database, we are able to consider
entry and exit of firms and thus, a broader sample of firms to identify acquirers in
cross-border deals.9 For the empirical analysis we use unconsolidated company
accounts. This allows us to separate acquirer’s from target’s operations after an
acquisition and to analyze the effects of cross-border M&As on domestic sales,
employment, and productivity. One limitation of the Amadeus database is that val-
ues for key variables like sales, employment, or financial indicators are missing for
some companies. Nonetheless, it has been found that the sectoral and aggregate
distribution of firm size and growth rates follows those from national labor force
surveys and the OECD Stan database (see Messina & Vallanti, 2007, for instance).
The only constraint is that the Amadeus database has an incomplete coverage of
very small firms as most firm-level data sets. However, as cross-border M&As
are usually not undertaken by small companies, this is of minor relevance for this
application as shown in the robustness section.
We merge the observations from Amadeus with the transaction data from our
second data source, the Zephyr database, an M&A database from the same provider.
Zephyr includes data on M&As, IPOs, joint ventures, and private equity transac-
tions and provides information about the date and value of a deal, the source of
financing as well as a description of the type of transaction and the firms involved
in the deal. We are thus able to identify the sequent foreign investments and to
reconstruct the growing international commitment of firms. The data are collected
from company reports, regional information providers, consulting firms, invest-
ment banks, firms’ web pages and press releases. Compared to other M&A data
sources like Thompson Financial Securities data, the Zephyr database has the ad-
vantage that there is no minimum deal value for a transaction to be included in
the data set.10 While the database does certainly not contain all M&A transactions
worldwide, we are confident that our data covers all M&As of firms that appear
in our data set, since Bureau van Dijk updates the ownership structure of all com-
9Update numbers 88, 113, 136, 146 and 168 are used. Although Amadeus provides
information on subsidiaries, this information is only available at one point in time for each
update. Further, the data does not allow for a definite distinction between newly founded
subsidiaries and existing firms that have been acquired. Therefore, we merged the firms
from Amadeus with the Zephyr database to gather information on M&A deals.
10When comparing aggregate statistics derived from own calculations of the Zephyr
database with those from Thompson financial data as used in Brakman et al. (2007a), we
found that the coverage of transactions with a deal value above 10 million US$ is very
similar. Calculations are available upon request.
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panies covered in the Amadeus database regularly. Due to the various channels of
information, the biggest and economically most relevant M&As should be covered
by the Zephyr database.
The data structure of this new combined European firm-level data set allows us
to focus explicitly on cross-border M&As. Since data availability varies consider-
ably across countries; we restrict our analysis to firms from the U.K. and France.
Both countries belong to the top five countries with respect to the number of ac-
quiring firms in international deals (Brakman et al., 2007a) and they are character-
ized by several institutional differences. While the former exhibits a market-based
financial system and flexible labor markets, France features a more bank-based
financial system and highly rigid labor markets.
The FDI definition applied by the OECD (1999) refers to investments of at
least 10% in order to separate portfolio investments from investments with a last-
ing interest in and relevant influence on the foreign firm. For the purpose of this
application, we consider only deals where a substantial change in the stakes hold is
involved as it is usual in the M&A literature. The presented results refer to M&As,
in which the stake controlled rises from below to above 25% as firms gain at least
a blocking minority.
In our sample, we delete enterprises with a median value of annual sales and
total assets below e2 million based on all available firm-year observations, and
firms active in the primary sector (NACE Revision 1.1 two-digit industry codes 1-
14) as these enterprises are usually not taking an active part in cross-border M&As.
We further deleted holding companies (NACE 7415), firms from the public sector
(NACE 75, 91), and financial companies (NACE 65-67) as the definition of output
or sales and hence any measure of total factor productivity in financial companies
is not comparable to other firms. Inspecting the growth rates of variables like
firm size and number of employees, we delete large outliers at both ends of the
distribution as they could indicate an unreported merger. After applying standard
cleaning procedures11 and restricting the sample to observations that have data
for all necessary variables in at least four consecutive years, we are left with 270
French and 646 British firm-year observations with at least one cross-border deal
recorded.
11We deleted observations with implausible values such as negative input factors or
values of tangible or intangible assets that exceed total fixed assets, and with growth rates
larger than the 199th and smaller than the first 200-quantile.
18
2.4.2 Model specification
We evaluate the impact of international acquisitions on several outcome variables.
Growth rates in the capital stock (measured as tangible fixed assets), sales, and em-
ployment are analyzed to evaluate whether international acquisitions complement
or substitute domestic activity. Total factor productivity (TFP) is considered as a
further outcome variable to investigate whether cross-border M&As lead to an in-
crease or decrease in domestic efficiency. We implement the Olley & Pakes’ (1996)
estimation algorithm, where we use investments to control for unobserved produc-
tivity shocks that induce a simultaneity problem in TFP estimation. This method
is restricted to observations with strictly positive investment in order to guarantee
a necessary invertability condition.12 We calculate TFP for all observations with
sales, labor, and capital figures available.
Regarding the choice of control variables in the logit model, heterogeneous
firm models like Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) suggest a systematic
selection into foreign investment activity according to the firms’ productivity lev-
els. To control for the selection of more productive firms into foreign markets we
include the level of TFP before the acquisition.
We include the log of the number of employees as a measure of firm size to
capture the firms’ ability to realize economies of scale as well as their capacity
of taking risks through internal diversification. The log average wage (total labor
costs divided by the number of employees) accounts for different skill structures
of the labor force. The log capital stock captures differences in the production
process and controls for the fact that multinational firms usually have a higher
capital intensity than domestic firms. Further, as an R&D proxy, we control for the
share of intangible assets in non-financial fixed assets, as this may affect domestic
growth as well as the returns to acquisitions and should account for the importance
of knowledge and technology for acquisitions. The working capital ratio defined as
the ratio of net current assets to total assets reflects the firms’ liquidity and captures
the ability to raise funds for an international acquisition. We include past sales
growth to capture differing domestic growth paths between acquirers and other
firms to avoid a spurious correlation between domestic growth and acquisitions.
12The alternative estimation strategy using material inputs instead of investment as
suggested in Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) is not an option as this variable is not available
for the U.K. sample. However, we found that measures of TFP constructed with materials
instead of investment in France were very similar.
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The firms’ internationalization status and past M&A activity before the deal
are captured by an exporting dummy for the previous year, and dummy variables
for previous national and cross-border deals. These variables take the value one
if the firm had acquired at least one national or foreign target in the three years
before the deal, respectively. Further, a variable with three categories that reflects
the change in the number of foreign subsidiaries (no change, increase, or decrease
in the number of foreign subsidiaries owned) is included as proxy for greenfield
investment.
The age of a firm in years can be interpreted as a reflection of learning (Jo-
vanovic, 1982) and is included as the logarithm of the number of years since incor-
poration as a further control for growth potentials and experience. In addition, a
dummy controlling for the legal form equals one if the acquirer is a public limited
company. Finally, differences in technological opportunities and the competitive
environment are accounted for by industry dummies at the NACE two-digit indus-
try level. A set of time dummies captures macroeconomic factors such as changes
in the business cycle or exchange rate movements. All variables are measured one
period before the cross-border M&A.
2.5 Results
Results from the logit estimation for the probability to invest abroad are shown in
table 2.1. A higher firm size in terms of employment or capital stock makes it more
likely to engage in an international acquisition. The positive coefficient for sales
growth shows that firms that invest abroad display higher domestic growth rates be-
fore the acquisition. The working capital ratio coefficient indicates that insufficient
internal finance could be an impediment to cross-border M&As. International ac-
quirers seem to have higher innovation potentials and employees with higher skills
as indicated by the positive coefficients for intangible assets and wages, respec-
tively. This supports the idea of technology and knowledge as a driving factor for
cross-border M&As.
Past M&A activity – both national and international – appears to be an impor-
tant predictor of cross-border M&As in subsequent periods. The same is true for
changes in the number of foreign subsidiaries owned by the firm and previous ex-
port activities - although this effect is only significant for British firms. This seems
plausible, as the knowledge of a firm gained in earlier operations at a global stage
reduces uncertainties related to foreign market entry and makes the successful re-
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alization of cross-border M&As more likely. The exporting status of French firms
does not explain further international activity significantly. One possible explana-
tion is that differences in the average firm size between acquirers and non-acquirers
are much more pronounced in the U.K. as can be seen in table 2.2 and 2.3. These
tables also show that the differences in the fraction of exporters between the un-
matched groups are also much larger in the British sample. Foreign-owned firms
have a lower probability to invest abroad, probably since they already have access
to foreign markets and technologies. So far, the results are in line with the expec-
tations.
Surprisingly, TFP has no significant effect on the probability of cross-border
acquisitions in the case of French firms, while British firms that engage in acqui-
sitions seem to be less productive conditional on all other regressors. This does
not necessarily contradict the results from the FDI literature predicting a positive
association between a firm’s productivity and its FDI propensity. The reason is the
inclusion of further variables as proxies for skills and innovation in our estima-
tion equation apart from TFP levels. Those variables are important determinants of
firm heterogeneity and productivity differences and are positively correlated with
foreign market entry. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that unconditional on these control
variables firms that engage in cross-border M&A are significantly more productive.
The success of the matching procedure is documented in tables 2.2 and 2.3.
The means of the covariates used in the logit equation of the unmatched sample
are compared in order to quantify the ex ante differences between acquirers and
the comparison group. Selection into treatment is reflected in almost all variables.
The matching procedure is able to reduce a substantial amount of bias resulting
from differences in the observed covariates. As the test statistics show, the differ-
ences between the treatment group and the matched control group are small and
insignificant for all variables used for the estimation of the propensity score. Most
importantly, there is practically no difference in the propensity score between the
two groups within each country, which is confirmed by an inspection of the shape
of the propensity score distribution of both groups (compare figures 2.1 and 2.2).
There, we also see that imposing the common support condition does not reduce
the sample significantly (six French and two British acquirers are dropped).
Table 2.4 displays the results from the difference-in-differences estimation for
the various outcome measures. Compared to other firms, both French and British
international acquirers realize higher output growth. Overall, cross-border acqui-
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sitions do not seem to substitute domestic production, but they are associated with
higher domestic sales growth in both countries. This complementarity between
foreign and domestic activity is accompanied by significant faster growth of cap-
ital and employment. The results differ across countries, however, when it comes
to the resulting productivity effects. The growth of TFP is about 4% and 7% larger
for French firms that engage in international acquisitions in the year of the deal and
in the first year after the deal, respectively, compared to firms that do not engage
in cross-border acquisitions. This difference becomes insignificant after two years,
however. British firms that engage in cross-border acquisitions do not achieve sig-
nificantly higher growth in TFP. While the size of the effects on sales and employ-
ment are comparable to each other, the capital growth rate is even higher, resulting
in an insignificant TFP effect in the U.K. sample.
The results indicate that cross-border acquisitions and domestic activity are
complements. A possible explanation is that cross-border M&As provide access to
new markets, which increases the intensity of headquarter activities such as mar-
keting, R&D, product development, and administration in the home country which
support both foreign and domestic production. The returns to these investments
generally increase with the volume of sales over which costs can be spread (see,
for instance, Cohen & Klepper, 1996). An alternative interpretation is that inter-
national acquisitions reallocate assets and production from less efficient targets to
more efficient acquiring firms as argued by Neary (2007).
Regarding the magnitude of our estimated effects, we estimate effects on sales
growth between 8% and 23% for a three-year interval. For comparison, Wagner
(2002) estimates effects of starting to export on firm size of around 13%. Desai
et al. (2009) find that an expansion of foreign sales by 1% point is associated with
increased domestic growth of 0.3% points. Thus, the magnitude of our estimated
effects appear to be plausible. The effects on TFP growth for French firms of about
4% are also similar to estimated effects of other types of foreign market expansion
or organizational changes. For instance, Blalock & Gertler (2004) find that after
firms start to export their productivity increases by 2% to 5% and productivity
effects of changes in workplace practices have been estimated in the range of 5%
to 14% (Black & Lynch, 2001). Given the size of the investment, comparable
productivity effects of cross-border M&As seem not unreasonable.
Irrespective of the positive association between cross-border M&As and do-
mestic activity on average, one could fear that there are negative effects on do-
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mestic production and employment for certain types of investments. As stressed
previously, results might vary depending on the underlying motivation for the deal.
Thus, we divide the sample with the aim to discriminate between different types of
deals and uncovering potential heterogeneity in the results. Doing this, we also try
to shed some further light on the observed cross-country differences in the produc-
tivity result, where the composition of the deals could drive the observed effects
on average. For this purpose, we take a closer look at the industry composition
of the deals. One concern is that negative effects on domestic growth are more
likely in manufacturing than in services, because exporting or a fragmentation of
the production process is less feasible in most service sectors. Another dimension
of industry heterogeneity we consider is technological intensity. Access to foreign
knowledge and technologies is probably an important factor behind cross-border
acquisitions in industries that are technology-intensive and this might lead to dif-
ferential impacts on domestic efficiency and growth. We use an industry classifica-
tion that groups activities in the manufacturing and service sector according to the
importance of technology and knowledge.13 Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the indus-
try composition of cross-border deals in France and the U.K, respectively. While
in both countries international acquisitions happen most frequently in knowledge-
intensive service industries, acquisitions of French firms are even more biased to-
wards knowledge-intensive service sectors, where almost half of all acquisitions
belong to in our estimation sample.
In France, the positive effect on sales is quite robust across the four subgroups.
Again, we cannot find any evidence for a negative employment effect. The positive
productivity effects for French firms seem to be predominantly driven by deals of
acquirers in technology and knowledge-intensive industries, where the productivity
differences are most pronounced and significant. The point estimates for other
services are even negative, but insignificant. For British firms, sales and production
inputs grow significantly faster for acquiring firms within all types of industries.
We observe a significantly positive productivity effect of international acquisitions
only in high-tech manufacturing.
13The classification was made on the basis of the sector approach by the Euro-
pean Commission (Eurostat) which classifies industries according to the ratio of R&D
spending to value added.See, for instance, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_-
SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf. We classified manufacturing industries as high-tech
if they are defined as ‘High Technology’ or ‘Medium High Technology’ by Eurostat and
classified knowledge-intensive services according to Eurostat.
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Hence, in both countries, there are industries, where cross-border acquirers
show a higher TFP growth rate and this seems to be mainly the case in high-tech
industries. One possible explanation is that in technology-intensive industries, ac-
quirers focus on access to complementary foreign technologies and knowledge that
improve domestic efficiency. Investments in low technology sectors might be un-
dertaken to gain access to the target’s market and products rather than to acquire
complementary technologies. This view is supported if we take another look at
table 2.5. Overall, 11% of the French and 28% of the British acquirers invest in
the U.S. In high-tech manufacturing sectors, however, this share is highest in each
of the two countries. Thus, precisely in the sectors with an above average share
of deals in the most technologically advanced region, we find positive productivity
effects supporting the view of technology-seeking motives for these deals.
The tests of equality of treatment effects in the last columns of 2.6 and 2.7 show
that cross-industry differences in productivity effects are statistically significant in
France and weakly so for British firms. It seems that heterogeneity in the produc-
tivity effects across countries can mainly be explained by the different composition
of deals across industries.
Technology sourcing might be a less important motive in industries with a low
technological intensity, where foreign market access is probably the dominant mo-
tive for cross-border M&As. Market access may lead to increased demand for
production and headquarter activities in the home country, but this does not nec-
essarily affect efficiency of production in terms of output per employee or unit of
capital.
The tests for treatment effect heterogeneity show that industry differences in
the effects on sales and employment growth are in some cases statistically signifi-
cant for British firms. With one exception, differences in the effects on growth rates
are insignificant for French firms even at the 10% level. Again, the results suggest
that differences in treatment effect heterogeneity across countries – especially re-
garding employment growth – are to some extent due to the differing composition
of deals across industries.
Still, the estimated effects on employment growth seem to be somewhat larger
in the U.K. There are several possible alternative explanations for this, which are
not mutually exclusive. First, labor markets are more rigid in France and hence,
French acquirers might in some cases be more likely to cancel explicit and implicit
contracts with employees after an acquisition (Shleifer & Summers, 1998). This
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effect might dampen the overall positive impact of foreign expansion in French
firms (see e.g. Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2004, and our discussion in section 2). Further,
British firms are more likely to engage in full acquisitions than French firms in
our sample (90% versus 50%) and finally, they more often invest in larger target
markets like the U.S., both of which might result in higher feedback effects.14
Another dimension of heterogeneity is the distinction between horizontal and
vertical acquisitions. Foreign market access is the goal of horizontal foreign in-
vestments. We use deals in which acquirers and targets operate in the same 2-digit
industry to approximate this type of investments. The remaining deals are clas-
sified as unrelated as most of those deals are probably conglomerate acquisitions
rather than vertical investments. The separate estimation of related and unrelated
deals does not extract differential behavior clearly. Our main result, the positive
effect of cross-border M&As on domestic growth seems to hold both for related
and unrelated acquisitions.15 Although this distinction is quite often applied in
empirical work, defining within-industry deals as horizontal FDI as opposed to
cross-industry investment is quite a crude approximation that probably does not
reflect perfectly the differences in the motives for the deals (for a discussion, see
Alfaro & Charlton, 2009).16
While both theoretical work and the evidence presented so far suggest im-
proved access to foreign markets and technologies as a main explanation for the
results found, there could be alternative stories. If acquirers use mechanisms such
as transfer pricing to shift profits the results might not correspond to actual changes
in real economic activity. While this is unlikely to affect our estimated effects for
employment and the capital stock, it might bias our results for sales and produc-
14Due to the small number of cross-border acquisitions, we refrain from separating
treatment effects across industries, full acquisitions and target markets simultaneously,
which would be necessary to disentangle the various explanations formally.
15Results are therefore not reported, but available upon request.
16Another way to approximate the type of investment would be the target country or re-
gion. Cost motives should lead to cross-border acquisitions in low-cost countries, whereas
market-seeking motives can be assumed for investments in large, equally developed coun-
tries. Most French firms invest in other Western European countries for their economic,
geographic, and cultural proximity. British firms prefer U.S. targets, where access to the
technological frontier might be decisive in addition to the large market (compare the first
two columns in table 2.5). Hence, factor costs do not seem to be a main driver of acquisi-
tions in our sample. Splitting the sample according to the target regions does not generate
any new insights as the number of observations for investment in low-cost countries is too
small.
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tivity. However, incentives for transfer pricing are probably small in our sample,
as most acquisition targets are located in countries in Western Europe and North
America which have similar statutory corporate tax rates and accounting standards.
Nonetheless, to investigate whether transfer pricing is an issue in our data set,
we analyze whether tax payments change significantly after cross-border M&As
similar to Egger et al. (2010). The reasoning is that if transfer pricing played
an important role, we should see that tax payments are reduced significantly af-
ter a cross-border acquisition. Transfer pricing might be easier in technology and
knowledge-intensive industries due to the higher share of intangible assets. There-
fore we rerun the matching procedure with tax payments scaled by pre-acquisition
sales to account for differences in firms size as an additional outcome variable for
the four industry groups in France.17 The results in table 2.8 show that 10 out of 12
estimated coefficients are insignificant. Only in one period we find a weakly signif-
icant positive association for knowledge intensive services and a weakly significant
negative association for other services. Tax savings seem not to be very relevant in
our sample, especially not in high-tech sectors. Thus, transfer pricing is not suffi-
cient to explain the overall positive effects on sales growth and the heterogeneous
effects on productivity across industries.
Yet another explanation for the estimated effects on domestic growth could
be that cross-border M&As are part of a firm’s general expansion strategy that
includes both domestic and foreign investments leading to a spurious correlation
between international acquisitions and domestic growth. To check whether this is
a likely explanation for our results we use domestic M&As as an outcome variable.
Results depicted in table 2.9 show no significant correlation between domestic and
cross-border acquisitions for British firms, while there seems to be some corre-
lation for French firms. However, the estimated effect is only weakly significant
in the first period and changes its sign in later periods. All in all, the correlation
seems to be rather unsystematic, hence, it seems unlikely that a simultaneous do-
mestic expansion strategy is the predominant explanation for our results.18 Finally,
17Unfortunately, tax payments are missing for most British firms in our sample. Hence,
we do not report results for the U.K.
18Note that it is not implausible that cross-border M&As have some effect on the in-
centives to engage in domestic M&As. In many oligopolistic models the incentives for
takeovers are increasing with market concentration and hence with previous M&As (see,
for instance, Neary, 2007, for an application to cross-border M&As.). Firms might also
be more likely to engage in further (domestic and foreign) M&As due to previous success
and experience. In contrast, cross-border and domestic M&As might also be substitutes
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we restrict the estimation sample to firms without additional domestic acquisitions
in the same period or in the two years after the deal and adjust the control group
accordingly. The results are basically unchanged (compare table 2.11 and table
2.10). The estimated effect on output growth is significant and positive in all spec-
ifications, and again no single negative effect shows up. It is thus unlikely that the
results found are determined predominantly by firms with simultaneous acquisition
in the domestic market.
Summing up, our results indicate that on average cross-border acquisitions
yield higher domestic production and in some cases efficiency gains in the home
country. Neither do we find that international acquisitions substitute domestic in-
vestment, nor are there adverse effects on employment growth for any of the two
countries and in any of the industries and types of deals considered.
2.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we provide several robustness checks regarding the estimated ef-
fects of cross-border M&As on the acquirers’ domestic growth rates of output, em-
ployment, investment, and productivity using a difference-in-differences estimator
in combination with propensity matching.
The first robustness check regards the definition of M&As. In the main spec-
ification we defined a cross-border M&A as an international transaction in which
the share of the acquisition target’s equity owned by the acquiring firm rises from
below to above 25%. The estimated effects do practically not change considering
deals where the acquirer obtains a majority interest after the acquisition (compare
the first columns in tables 2.12 and 2.13).
A look at the distribution of the acquired stake reveals that there are quite a lot
of deals with very small changes around one per cent only that stem from repeated
share buyback activity. The two peaks of the distribution can be found at 50%
and 100%. Thus we have only little variation across the two samples. We further
checked whether firms with multiple acquisitions led to an overestimation of the
average treatment effect. Calculating the effects for firms with only one acquisition
per year separately - which includes the majority of our observations - changes the
due to limited financial resources and organizational capabilities.
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results only slightly. The same holds true for the British sample if alternatively
firms with the first acquisition after at least three years are considered, while the
productivity effects disappears in the French case (see the second and last columns
in tables 2.12 and 2.13 for France and the U.K., respectively).
A further decision that we have to make is the number of years that we fol-
low the effects of the deals. In the main specification we estimated the effects of
cross-border M&As on outcome variables in periods t, t+1, and t+2. On the one
hand, potential restructuring measures might take some time to come into effect,
so a longer time horizon would be an interesting extension. On the other hand,
even the basic specification is already very data demanding. Including the third
year after the deal in the analysis thus reduces the sample quite substantially. As a
consequence, some of the effects are less precisely estimated and lose their statisti-
cal significance. All results, however, still indicate the same direction of the effects
and a very similar magnitude and effects even increase in the third period after the
deal (first columns of table 2.14 and 2.15).
Another robustness check relates to the problem of panel attrition. We check
the consequences of relaxing the restriction of our main specification that only
firms are included for which data is available in both periods after the deal (the
second columns of tables 2.14 and 2.15). Again, the results are robust to this vari-
ation. Finally, although it is quite common to use the period before treatment, a
potential concern could be the chosen reference period for the conditioning vari-
ables in the propensity score estimation. If the decision of firms to engage in in-
ternational M&As is made quite in advance and firms use the pre-acquisition year
for adjusting domestic production to the upcoming integration process, condition-
ing on variables measured two periods before the deal would be more appropriate.
Hence, in this alternative specification, we drop the second year after the deal to
keep enough observations. Results are still similar to the basic specification (see
the last columns of tables 2.14 and 2.15).
The inclusion of the smallest firms in a country is another variation in the def-
inition of the estimation sample. In our main specification we decided to exclude
firms with a median value of annual sales and total assets below e2 million based
on all available firm-year observations. However, removing this restriction and us-
ing all firms in the sample again does not change the results notably (see the second
column in tables 2.16 and 2.17).
To check the robustness of our results for productivity, we use labor produc-
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tivity (sales per employee) as an alternative productivity measure instead of total
factor productivity (TFP). While the Olley & Pakes method used to construct a
consistent TFP measure takes panel attrition and the endogeneity of production in-
put factors into account, it critically hinges on functional form restrictions and the
validity of instrumental variables. However, TFP and labor productivity are highly
correlated in our estimation sample. Results using labor productivity as outcome
variable are depicted in the last columns of tables 2.16 and 2.17. Not surprisingly,
we find similar results as before.
A crucial assumption of the matching procedure we used for the estimation of
the average treatment effect is the assumption of selection on observables. Hence,
further robustness checks are performed to check the sensitivity of the results to-
wards using different control variables. To account for possible differences in the
growth trends of the two groups, we included the last year’s sales growth as a
conditioning variable in the estimation of the propensity score in the main specifi-
cation. One could argue for the inclusion of past changes of all dependent variables
of interest in order to control for varying trends in the evolution of the firms’ pro-
ductivity level, capital, or employment. Including all but one growth rates does not
change our results notably (second columns of tables 2.16 and 2.17). Note, that we
have to exclude one growth rate and one level to avoid multicollinearity problems
as the TFP measure is a linear combination of the factor inputs and output. We
excluded the TFP growth rate and the sales level. As sufficient liquidity is an im-
portant prerequisite for a firm to be able to finance a deal, we control additionally
for changes in the liquidity measure one or two periods before the deal. The re-
sults show that our results are unaffected from these changes (compare table 2.18).
All in all, these robustness checks indicate that the inclusion of a large number of
controls in the logit estimation captures already a substantial part of the important
differences between the two groups of firms.
Using a matching approach, the selection of an adequate control group is cru-
cial for the interpretation of the results. In our main specification, the estimated
effects are calculated as the differences between the treatment group of acquirers
and the chosen control group of firms not involved in a cross-border deal in the
years of the deal and after the deal. Thus, the control group includes firms that en-
gage in greenfield investments and domestic M&As as well as firms without such
investments. We estimate three alternative models each to check whether the re-
sults are robust to changes in the definition of the control group, in particular with
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respect to their domestic M&A and greenfield investment activity (compare table
2.19 and 2.20 for France and the U.K., respectively). The three alternative speci-
fications are C1.) the control firms have no cross-border acquisition in t; C2.) the
control firms have no cross-border and no domestic acquisition in t; and C3.) the
control firms have no cross-border, no domestic acquisition and no change in the
number of foreign affiliates in t. The results from these variations confirm our pre-
vious results: in the British sample, we get mainly unchanged results both in terms
of statistical significance and magnitude of the effects. For France, the sales effect
is strong and significant in all specifications, where the investment and employ-
ment effect is always positive and of similar magnitude, but loses its significance
in some periods and specifications. As before, the productivity effect is less robust
across specifications.
Although the results of the matching procedure seem to be robust to intro-
ducing further covariates, we cannot formally test the assumption of selection on
observables. However, it is possible to calculate the magnitude of the bias that
would be necessary to outweigh our estimated treatment effects. For this purpose
we display Rosenbaum bounds, which indicate the minimum value by which an
unobserved factor would have to change the odds ratio of a matched pair i and j
P (CBit=1|Xit)(1−P (CBit=1|Xit))
P (CBjt=1|Xjt)(1−P (CBjt=1|Xjt) to reduce the significance of our estimated average
treatment effect on the treated below a certain confidence level. Given conventional
levels of significance, the critical values for domestic sales, capital and employment
growth vary between 1.2 for capital growth for French firms and above 2.0 for em-
ployment growth in the British sample (tables 2.21 and 2.22). A factor that could
change the odds ratio even by a factor of the lower bound of 1.2 in France must
have a larger effect on the probability of an acquisition than an increase of the num-
ber of employees in the pre-acquisition period by 50% or an increase in the capital
stock by 70%. Transforming the estimated coefficients of the logit model into odds
ratios led to values of 1.279 for capital and 1.384 in the French sample. The critical
values for TFP are as expected quite low, as they were only partly significant in our
main specifications. Note also that this factor must in addition completely deter-
mine the observed difference in the outcome variables of acquiring firms and the
comparison group. While differences between acquirers and non-acquirers exceed
these thresholds in our unmatched sample, these differences are eliminated by the
choice of our control group. Given that our propensity score estimates control for
a large set of covariates including the main determinants from the theoretical and
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empirical literature, we argue that it is unlikely that an omitted factor has such a
large effect on both the propensity to engage in a cross-border acquisition and the
domestic growth of sales, employment and capital. In conclusion, it does not seem
very plausible that our estimated positive effects of cross-border acquisitions on
domestic growth are entirely due to omitted variables.
Moreover, we investigate the robustness of our results to using alternative
matching algorithms (see tables 2.23 and 2.24). In our baseline specification we
use only one control observation as a match where the one with the closest propen-
sity score is chosen irrespective of the actual distance. First, we implement caliper
matching imposing a maximum distance of 0.1 for the difference in propensity
scores within each matched pair. Second, some alternative matching algorithms
that use a larger number of matches for each acquiring firm are applied to reduce
the variance of the estimator. However, this comes at the cost of an increased poten-
tial bias as on average the matching quality is lower. We perform radius matching
with a maximum bandwidth of 0.1, which uses all firms from the comparison group
within a maximum distance in the propensity score of 0.1. Further, we show the
results using three instead of only one nearest neighbor combined with a caliper of
0.1. The sensitivity of the results with respect to the primary matching criterion –
the propensity score – are analyzed by the use of a Mahalanobis matching estima-
tor that chooses a nearest neighbor not only with respect to the propensity score,
but gives additional weight to a firm’s industry, age and the year of acquisition, as
these variables might be especially important determinants of firm growth. This
comes at the cost of a large sample reduction as we lose several matches due to the
common support condition. Next, some variants of a kernel matching estimator
that use a weighted average of all firms in the comparison group to construct the
counterfactual are applied (see the first two columns of tables 2.25 and 2.26). The
weights for the kernel estimator are based on differences in the propensity score
between acquirers and firms from the comparison group and a normal and alter-
natively a uniform kernel function. Using kernel functions, an important choice is
the bandwidth of the estimator. Considering the implied trade-off between vari-
ance and potential bias, we reran the matching procedure with a bandwidth of 0.2
and 0.02 (columns three and four of tables 2.25 and 2.26). The estimations show
that our main findings are robust to using alternative matching estimators. For
both countries we find large and highly significant effects on the domestic growth
of sales, employment and capital. Positive productivity effects only show up for
French firms, but they are not significant in all cases.
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The multiple robustness checks so far refer to the same estimation strategy. In
addition, we finally apply a fixed effects estimator to our datasets. We run fixed
effects panel regressions of the levels of the four outcome variables in t, t+1, and
t+2 on a cross-border dummy variable. As control variables we use all lagged
time-varying variables that were included in the logit estimation of the propensity
score. In France, the output expansion effect and partly the labor effect are highly
significant and of the same magnitude as before. All other coefficients point into
the right direction, but as in other checks, they appear less robust in terms of sta-
tistical significance. The results for the British sample are mainly identical to the
matching and difference-in-difference estimates (table 2.27).
2.7 Conclusion
Cross-border acquisitions occur more and more frequently and often involve tremen-
dous deal values. These huge investments between countries stir up fears concern-
ing the relocation of domestic economic activity in many countries, but also raise
hope for strengthening the acquiring firms’ position within an industry and inter-
nationally. This contribution provides first evidence on the effects of cross-border
acquisitions on the investing firms’ domestic performance. Our empirical analysis
is based on a combination of matching techniques with a difference-in-differences
estimator that is applied to a micro data set of firms from the U.K. and France,
two European countries among the top five with the highest M&A activity in terms
of the number of acquirers. Our main result shows that cross-border deals yield
higher growth rates of domestic sales, employment, and capital in acquiring firms,
which are in some cases accompanied by higher productivity growth.
We perform separate analyses for manufacturing and service industries and
technology-intensive industries to uncover heterogeneous effects. Domestic sales
growth is positively related to cross-border acquisitions in all industry types within
both countries, and domestic employment growth and investment in the acquiring
firm is not negatively affected in any case. We find significant effects on total
factor productivity for technology-intensive industries only, which suggests that
firms within these industries acquire complementary technologies abroad in line
with theoretical work. The positive effect of international acquisitions on domestic
activity might stem from increased domestic production that is used to serve newly
entered foreign markets, and increased headquarter activities such as marketing
and product development that can be applied to a larger production output after
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a foreign expansion. A variety of checks indicate that our results are unlikely to
be explained by alternative mechanisms such as transfer pricing or a simultaneous
expansion of domestic and foreign activities that are unrelated to the effect of cross-
border M&As. These effects are robust towards different matching algorithms,
definitions of the control group, and model specifications controlling not only for
observed differences in a wide range of variables, but also for potentially diverging
domestic growth paths between the group of acquiring firms and control units.
The positive effects on the investing firms should be taken into account when
evaluating the welfare effects of cross-border M&As. Policy measures that mutu-
ally prevent international M&As between two countries might reduce growth and
welfare in both countries since they impede access to foreign markets and tech-
nologies. For future research, it might be interesting to shed further light on the
relation between the effects on target and acquiring firms in cross-border deals to
assess their global economic consequences.
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Figure 2.1
Propensity score density – France.
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Table 2.2
Balancing test – France.
bias t-test
% reduc- equal
Sample Treated Comparison bias tion means p-value
TFP Unmatched 1.129 0.750 52.0 8.65 0.000
Matched 1.111 1.167 -7.7 85.2 -0.84 0.400
Wage Unmatched 4.051 3.590 104.5 20.09 0.000
Matched 4.038 4.019 4.3 95.9 0.47 0.640
Sales Unmatched 0.099 0.051 18.6 3.41 0.001
growth Matched 0.098 0.107 -3.4 81.6 -0.38 0.703
Capital Unmatched 8.471 6.303 99.6 21.57 0.000
Matched 8.398 8.623 -10.4 89.6 -1.01 0.315
Labor Unmatched 5.609 4.047 96.4 22.74 0.000
Matched 5.565 5.839 -16.9 82.5 -1.61 0.109
Intangible Unmatched 0.326 0.190 46.7 8.36 0.000
assets Matched 0.324 0.323 0.4 99.2 0.04 0.968
Working Unmatched 0.129 0.175 -18.3 -3.05 0.002
capital ratio Matched 0.131 0.162 -12.4 32.6 -1.50 0.135
Exporter Unmatched 0.596 0.546 10.3 1.67 0.095
Matched 0.598 0.598 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
National Unmatched 0.322 0.007 94.0 61.87 0.000
deals Matched 0.311 0.295 4.5 95.2 0.38 0.705
Cross-border Unmatched 0.430 0.003 120.9 115.81 0.000
deals Matched 0.417 0.383 9.7 92.0 0.80 0.425
∆ foreign Unmatched 0.474 0.025 102.0 40.18 0.000
subsidaries Matched 0.462 0.485 -5.2 94.9 -0.47 0.638
Foreign Unmatched 0.052 0.106 -20.0 -2.87 0.004
owner Matched 0.053 0.049 1.4 92.9 0.20 0.844
Legal form Unmatched 0.785 0.346 98.6 15.14 0.000
Matched 0.780 0.792 -2.6 97.4 -0.32 0.751
Age Unmatched 3.189 2.964 26.8 4.80 0.000
Matched 3.174 3.150 2.9 89.3 0.32 0.746
Propensity Unmatched 0.217 0.002 103.0 156.82 0.000
score Matched 0.201 0.201 0.1 99.9 0.01 0.992
37
Table 2.3
Balancing test – United Kingdom.
bias t-test
% reduc- equal
Sample Treated Comparison bias tion means p-value
TFP Unmatched 1.085 0.980 12.9 2.92 0.004
Matched 1.084 1.094 -1.2 90.5 -0.26 0.792
Wage Unmatched 3.858 3.657 42.1 10.03 0.000
Matched 3.859 3.880 -4.5 89.4 -0.85 0.394
Sales Unmatched 0.099 0.062 10.5 2.78 0.006
growth Matched 0.099 0.096 0.6 94.1 0.11 0.911
Capital Unmatched 10.752 7.724 125.3 37.59 0.000
Matched 10.742 10.887 -6.0 95.2 -0.93 0.351
Labor Unmatched 7.457 4.713 148.2 48.77 0.000
Matched 7.450 7.496 -2.5 98.3 -0.38 0.707
Intangible Unmatched 0.413 0.076 122.3 42.14 0.000
assets Matched 0.412 0.410 0.8 99.3 0.12 0.901
Working Unmatched 0.155 0.127 10.3 2.33 0.020
Capital Matched 0.156 0.152 1.5 85.7 0.32 0.753
Exporter Unmatched 0.638 0.335 63.6 16.26 0.000
Matched 0.637 0.643 -1.3 97.9 -0.23 0.817
National Unmatched 0.489 0.029 123.5 68.31 0.000
deals Matched 0.491 0.503 -3.3 97.3 -0.45 0.656
Cross-border Unmatched 0.528 0.007 145.6 146.88 0.000
deals Matched 0.526 0.489 10.4 92.9 1.34 0.181
∆ foreign Unmatched 0.370 0.012 74.5 56.85 0.000
subsidieries Matched 0.368 0.373 -1.0 98.7 -0.13 0.893
Foreign Unmatched 0.037 0.113 -29.0 -6.06 0.000
owner Matched 0.037 0.037 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Legal form Unmatched 0.728 0.083 174.1 59.04 0.000
Matched 0.727 0.741 -3.8 97.8 -0.57 0.571
Age Unmatched 2.992 2.866 12.7 3.59 0.000
Matched 2.995 2.961 3.5 72.6 0.56 0.572
Propensity Unmatched 0.293 0.004 140.1 193.43 0.000
score Matched 0.291 0.291 0.0 100.0 0.01 0.996
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Figure 2.2
Propensity score density – United Kingdom.
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Chapter 3
Productivity and the
internationalization of firms:
cross-border acquisitions versus
greenfield investments
3.1 Introduction
This chapter adds to the empirical literature on the determinants of international
activity at the firm level. In particular, it analyzes the sorting pattern of firms into
different modes of foreign market entry depending on their productivity level with
a focus on two different types of FDI, namely greenfield entry and cross-border
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The contribution of the present work is to test
for the first time the productivity ranking of internationally active firms established
in the theoretical model by Nocke & Yeaple (2007). The results show that FDI
does not always involve the most productive firms within a sector as soon as it
is accounted for the different modes of foreign investments. Thus, the analysis
provides new empirical evidence on the Helpman et al. (2004) predictions that
hold on average, but not across all types of FDI and not within all sectors. For
productivity comparisons it matters whether MNEs engage abroad via greenfield
investments or cross-border acquisitions.
Helpman et al. (2004) provide a model of heterogeneous firms in an industry
that decide whether to serve the foreign market either through exports or to engage
in FDI. Firms that want to build a foreign affiliate have to incur set-up costs that
are higher than the fixed costs of exporting, but they save on per unit transportation
costs. The implied proximity-concentration trade-off between producing closer to
the consumer and producing with higher economies of scale leads to a specific
productivity ranking of firms in an industry: only the most productive firms decide
to invest abroad, while less efficient firms serve the foreign market via exports as
illustrated schematically in figure 3.1. In this context, Helpman et al. (2004) refer
to greenfield investments only, where a new firm is set-up abroad, while the al-
ternative entry via cross-border acquisitions of existing firms is neglected (Neary,
2009).1 More recently, the attention shifted to the composition of FDI with regard
to the particular form of market entry. Different reasons arise for firms to choose
either greenfield entry or cross-border acquisitions. Apart from strategic consider-
ations – greenfield investments add a new firm to the foreign market, whereas an
1Furthermore, the primary motivation of firms to invest abroad is market access. This
horizontal type of FDI refers to a duplication of the domestic production process abroad
in order to serve the foreign market locally, thereby substituting exports (in the spirit of
Markusen, 1984; Brainard, 1997). Vertical FDI, in contrast, transfers parts of the firm’s
production process into another country to exploit existing cross-country cost differences,
thus resulting in increased intra-firm trade (such as analyzed in Helpman, 1984; Alfaro &
Charlton, 2009).
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acquisition can be thought of as a change in ownership (Markusen & Stähler, 2009;
Görg, 2000) – one important difference is the acquisition of complementary assets.
This motive is well known in the M&A literature (see, for example, Jovanovic
& Braguinsky, 2004), and empirical evidence shows that it is particularly relevant
for cross-border acquisitions, while it plays a minor role for domestic deals (Frey
& Hussinger, 2006). This is plausible if one thinks of parts of a firm’s stock of
knowledge to be market specific. The acquisition of a foreign target firm provides
a way to gain access to these valuable assets and knowledge at the cost of the acqui-
sition price. In contrast, MNEs choosing greenfield entry use their own technology
both at home and abroad. Given this key difference in the nature of the two entry
modes, the characteristics of firms engaging in either one can be expected to vary
as well.
The latter distinction is picked up in the theoretical model of Nocke & Yeaple
(2007) that analyzes the choice between three foreign entry modes: exporting,
cross-border M&A, and greenfield investment.2 Not only are firms modeled to
be heterogeneous with respect to their productivity, but in addition sectors differ
regarding the underlying source of the observed productivity differences. In one
sector, firms display productivity differences mainly due to an internationally mo-
bile capability, while more market-specific assets drive the heterogeneity of firms
in the other industry. Depending on whether immobile or mobile capabilities de-
termine firm heterogeneity within a certain industry, a different subset of firms
decide to use a specific foreign entry mode. The known proximity-concentration
trade-off still is at work in both types of industries so that more productive firms
always prefer greenfield investment over exports. The group of firms that decides
to acquire a foreign target firm, however, varies across the two types of industries.
The interplay between the firms’ capabilities, the importance of either capability
in the sector, and the acquisition price that is set in the merger market determines
whether the most or least productive firms of all internationally active firms engage
in a cross-border acquisition.
The most efficient firms acquire an existing foreign firm whenever the under-
lying source of firm heterogeneity is easily transferred to foreign countries. Those
firms seek to combine their own exceptional mobile assets with complementary
foreign market-specific know-how to be able to exploit their productivity advan-
2Eicher & Kang (2005) also analyze these three entry modes, they focus on country
and market characteristics and do not include firm heterogeneity.
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tage abroad. The predicted productivity ranking implies the known sorting pattern
of MNEs, exporters, and domestic firms, whereby those firms choosing greenfield
investments are in between the productivity levels of acquirers and exporting firms.
The described ranking is sketched in the second line of figure 3.1. If the relevant
determinant of productivity advantages is less mobile across borders, however, the
productivity ordering is partly reversed: in this case, firms with the lowest pro-
ductivity of all internationally active firms acquire an existing foreign firm, while
the most efficient firms engage in greenfield investments. For firms with the best
immobile, more market-specific capabilities, it does not pay off to costly acquire
the knowledge of the local firm as their productivity advantage is strong enough to
compensate for its reduced effectiveness in the foreign market. The least produc-
tive firms, in contrast, need to acquire a foreign firm to be able to compete in the
foreign market at all. In contrast to Helpman et al. (2004), FDI does not always
involve the most productive firms if the entry mode is taken into account. The third
line of figure 3.1 corresponds to this prediction.
Although the literature started to emphasize cross-border M&As and greenfield
investments as two distinct modes of FDI recently (Nocke & Yeaple, 2008; Neary,
2009; Stiebale & Trax, 2011), empirical evidence is still rather scarce. Several em-
pirical studies report a productivity advantage of established MNEs over exporters
(Greenaway & Kneller, 2007; Tomiura, 2007; Arnold & Hussinger, 2010), with
some evidence that large and more productive firms self-select to become MNEs
(Girma et al., 2005; Jäckle & Wamser, 2010; Damijan et al., 2007). To the best
of my knowledge there is no study that takes into account the two modes of FDI
in addition to the firms’ exporting decision with an explicit differentiation of mo-
bile and non-mobile industries. Nocke & Yeaple (2008) find firms engaging in
greenfield investments to be significantly more productive compared to acquirers
in cross-border deals. However, exporting as a third mode of foreign market en-
try is not considered. In Raff et al. (2012), even more variations of possible entry
modes are considered (wholly-owned versus jointly owned affiliates) analyzing a
Japanese dataset. Without considering industry differences, the authors also find
more productive firms to prefer greenfield investments over cross-border acquisi-
tions.3
3There is more empirical work on the choice between greenfield investment and cross-
border acquisitions such as Andersson & Svensson (1994). They usually focus on the
influence of country and industry characteristics though and do not look at firm produc-
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However, understanding which firms of an industry choose a certain foreign
entry mode is important for several reasons. The effects of cross-border invest-
ments on the investing and competing firms probably depend on whether the most
or less productive firms typically try to acquire a target firm abroad or plan to build
up a new firm. Often discussed spillover effects of foreign entry, for example,
might be contingent on the investors own productivity level (Keller, 2004; Javor-
cik, 2004). In addition, as shown by Nocke & Yeaple (2007), theoretical predic-
tions regarding the effects of trade liberalization on average industry productivity
and on production reallocations between firms crucially depend on the mapping
from the firms’ productivity to their internationalization choice. Finally, although
cross-border investments are an even rarer firm activity than exporting, their rel-
ative impact across economies is huge (compare Bernard et al., 2007a): In 2007,
the UNCTAD’s (2010) World Investment Report counted 7,018 deals and 12,210
greenfield investments worldwide. At the same time, M&As were shown to be a
potentially important channel for industry restructuring and asset reallocation after
periods of trade liberalizations (Neary, 2007; Bertrand & Zitouna, 2006; Breinlich,
2008). In fact, transaction values involved in cross-border deals are extremely high:
the total value of worldwide cross-border M&As amounted to over one trillion US
dollars and accounted as such for over half of the value of global FDI flows at their
latest peak in the year 2007.
Using a large firm-level panel data set of British firms, I am able to define the
two types of foreign investment. The panel structure of the data allows to analyze
productivity differences before the actual foreign market entry to separate the se-
lection mechanism from the reverse effects of international activity on the firms’
productivity. The distinction of the two industry types is operationalized using the
share of intangible assets over non-financial fixed assets. I argue that industries
with a high share of intangible assets can be interpreted as sectors where the firms’
productivity advantage is based on mobile capabilities, as those intangibles can
be combined with local assets in all parts of the firm simultaneously. Industries
displaying a lower share are classified as non-mobile.
Considering acquirers of foreign firms and firms that build up a new affili-
ate abroad separately reveals considerable heterogeneity across modes of FDI and
between industries. In line with the mechanism proposed by Nocke & Yeaple
(2007), acquirers in cross-border deals are the most productive firms in sectors
tivity.
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with a high share of intangibles, but they are the least productive group of all inter-
nationally active firms in the complementary low intangibles industry group. Not
all future MNEs are necessarily more productive than exporters if the type of FDI
and industry are taken into account. In contrast to the theoretical predictions, the
specific source for the industries’ high intangible assets seems to matter less, as
cross-border acquirers are the most productive firms both in R&D and advertising-
intensive manufacturing industries.
This chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section, I present the data and
variable definitions, while section 3.3 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 3.4
contains the results. Section 3.5 is devoted to several robustness checks, the last
section concludes this chapter.
3.2 Data
The analysis is based on a comprehensive firm-level data set that is constructed
combining financial data and ownership information for European firms with a
global M&A database that allows for the distinction between the two modes of
foreign direct investment.
The financial data is taken from the Amadeus database published by Bureau
van Dijk, which provides information on firms’ balance sheets, and profit and loss
accounts for up to ten years. The data is collected from company reports that are
supplemented by specialized regional information providers. These data have been
used in numerous studies on FDI such as in Egger et al. (2010); Helpman et al.
(2004); Budd et al. (2005). Among the main advantages of the dataset are its ex-
tensive coverage as it is not limited to listed companies. Although there is some
bias towards larger firms, this should not be problematic for the present analysis
as the smallest firms are typically not involved in international activities. A funda-
mental feature of the data is the availability of unconsolidated accounts that display
balance sheet items separately for the single enterprise in contrast to the whole cor-
porate group. Combining eight consecutive updates of the Amadeus database for
the years 2000-2007, I have yearly data on the number of foreign subsidiaries of
each firm.4 I merge the observations from Amadeus with the transaction data from
4Each update of Amadeus provides information on subsidiaries for one point in time
only.
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the Zephyr database, an M&A database from the same provider. Zephyr includes
data on M&As, IPOs, joint ventures, and private equity transactions and provides
information about date and value of a deal, as well as identifiers for the firms in-
volved in the deal.
The data structure of this new combined European firm level data set allows for
the necessary differentiation between cross-border M&As and greenfield invest-
ments and the reconstruction of the growing international commitment of firms
over time. The exact number of cross-border deals is extracted from the Zephyr
data. The information for greenfield projects has to be approximated: Subtracting
the number of cross-border deals per year and firm from the change in the reported
number of foreign subsidiaries between two years given in the Amadeus data, I
define greenfield investments as a residual category. I concentrate on investments
where the acquirer gains at least a majority interest in the target firm as it is usual
in the M&A literature.5
The approximation of greenfield investments suffers from two potential inac-
curacies. Although the quality of the M&A database is high, for some deals not all
necessary information is reported. In those cases, the generated value for greenfield
investment would be too high when the resulting affiliate is reported in Amadeus.
This should be a minor problem, however, as the two datasets origin from the same
data provider, so that all relevant data for the deal should be available if the affili-
ate is reported in Amadeus.6 The figures on greenfield investments are downward
biased, on the other hand, whenever a firm closes or sells previously acquired firms
within one year. If these measurement errors would be too strong, they could blur
the classification of the two types of investment. The observed difference in the
productivity levels should then be biased if anything towards zero. As the pro-
ductivity ranking changes across sectors mainly due to the group of cross-border
acquirers, the main results should not be affected by this approximation error.
The main variable of interest is the firms’ efficiency. In line with the empirical
literature, a frequently used measure of a firm’s productivity level is the total factor
5Most deals are majority acquisitions or even full acquisitions. The remaining small
part of deals results from share buyback activities involving increases in the stake hold of
only few percentage points.
6When comparing aggregate statistics derived from own calculations of the Zephyr
database restricted to deals with a deal value above 10 million US$ with those from
Thompson financial data as used in Brakman et al. (2007a), the coverage of transactions
appears to be very similar.
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productivity (TFP) calculated as the residual of a production function estimation.
I implement Olley & Pakes’ (1996) estimation algorithm that uses investments to
control for unobserved productivity shocks that induce a simultaneity problem in
the TFP estimation and that also controls for firm exit.7 I calculate TFP for all
observations with sales, labor, and capital figures available. As in the theoretical
literature efficiency is usually expressed directly in terms of sales, this measure and
alternative productivity estimates are discussed in the robustness section.
Next, I define exporters in a comparable way to cross-border acquisition and
greenfield investment measures. Thinking about FDI, a crucial distinction is be-
tween the stock or flow of FDI. The former is the amount already invested abroad,
while the latter refers to the change in the stock of FDI. Cross-border M&As and
greenfield investments can be interpreted as flow variables as they reflect addi-
tional investment abroad, whereas the number of foreign affiliates corresponds
to the stock of FDI. As no information on exports per market is available in the
dataset, I generate a variable that is equal to one if a firm increases significantly its
export turnover (export turnover grows more than 50%). While this approach might
have its weaknesses regarding the direct link to the theoretical underpinnings, it is
in line with the empirical literature that tested Helpman et al. (2004). To the best
of my knowledge there is no dataset available that combines the necessary panel
firm level information on exporting with the distinction of the two types of foreign
direct investments.
For the estimation sample, British firms are selected, as the data availability is
particularly high and the United Kingdom is one of the countries worldwide with
the most acquirers in cross-border deals (Brakman et al., 2007a). Only firms for
which unconsolidated balance sheet data are available are included. Firms that
are active in the primary sector, holding companies (NACE code 7415), and firms
from the public sector (NACE 75, 91) are deleted. I exclude financial companies
(NACE 65-67) as the definition of output or sales and hence any measure of total
factor productivity is not comparable to other firms. Inspecting the growth rates
of variables like firm size and number of employees, I delete large outliers at both
ends of the distribution as they could indicate an unreported merger. After applying
standard cleaning procedures,8 I am left with 249,014 firm-year observations.
7The alternative estimation strategy using material inputs instead of investments as
suggested in Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) is not an option as this variable is not available
for the UK.
8Deletion of observations with implausible values such as negative input factors or
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3.3 Estimation
There are two commonly used approaches to measure the productivity differences
between firms. One strategy is to test for differences in the productivity distribu-
tions between groups of firms in the spirit of Delgado et al. (2002) and Girma et al.
(2005), the other consists of regressing a productivity measure on internationaliza-
tion dummies as in Bernard & Jensen (1999) and Head & Ries (2003). Following
the latter approach, I estimate the following equation separately for each industry:
ln(TFPit) = α0 + αXfutureXit + αCBfutureCBit + αGIfutureGIit
+ βXXit + βCBCBit + βGIGIit + βCit + γj + γt + εit, (3.1)
whereX refers to exporters,CB to acquirers in a cross-border deal andGI to firms
engaged in greenfield investment. Theses variables define firms who have already
used the respective entry mode within the last three years. In combination with the
prefix ‘future’, the variables refer to firms that currently do not but that are going to
use the specific entry mode within the next three years. Including these two sets of
variables allows to separate the ex-ante productivity differential before the actual
foreign market entry that reflects the selection mechanism of interest from poten-
tial productivity effects after the firm has entered the foreign market. The estimated
coefficients αk of the internationalization dummies reflect the productivity advan-
tage of the group of firms that is going to choose the respective internationalization
strategy compared to firms that will not use the respective entry mode given other
international activities, which is the focus of this contribution. To see whether firms
of group k are more or less productive than firms in group l, two-sided t-tests of
the following null hypothesis are performed:
H0 : αl − αk = 0, (3.2)
where αk and αl are the estimated coefficients and k, l ∈ {X,CB,GI}.
Cit is a standard set of control variables to capture further systematic differ-
ences that might bias the estimated productivity gap (Wagner, 2007). The log of
the number of employees as well as its square and the firms’ capital stock are
included as measures of firm size, the log average wage accounts for the composi-
intangible assets ratios above one, and with growth rates larger than the highest and
smaller than the first 200-quantile.
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tion of the labor force, and the age of a firm and its square are included to reflect
learning effects. In addition, I control for foreign majority shareholders as foreign
owned firms usually have a productivity advantage over domestically owned firms
(Harris & Robinson, 2003); a further dummy identifies public companies (Harhoff
et al., 1998). γj refers to a set of industry dummies at the two-digit NACE level, as
productivity comparisons are meaningful only within industries, and they capture
industry characteristics that could influence the entry mode choice. γt stands for a
set of time dummies to account for macroeconomic circumstances. Given the panel
structure of the model, standard errors are clustered at the firm level to correct for
intra-group correlated standard errors.
The chosen approach is clearly descriptive in nature and does not claim a causal
interpretation. In the literature that compares exporters with non-exporters, several
estimation methods for the identification of productivity as a causal factor have
been applied that could be extended in principle to include MNEs.9 The main
difficulty of such alternative approaches like, for instance, a multinomial choice
model, lies in the construction of mutually exclusive categories of firms accord-
ing to their internationalization status. Considering all possible combinations, six
categories had to be included when introducing the two types of FDI.10 The num-
ber of observations in some industries for some of these categories is too low to
achieve stable estimates. In addition, another advantage of the chosen regression
framework is the possibility to control for all potential combinations of past in-
ternational experience and the various internationalization patterns. Thus, I can
analyze the selection of firms into the respective internationalization modes with-
out restricting the analysis to future international and current domestic firms. The
results of Andersson & Svensson (1994), for example, indicate that the probability
to choose a certain FDI mode might depend on the existing international expe-
rience of the firm. A restricted sample would probably be highly selective and
additionally reduce the number of observations of future cross-border acquisitions
and greenfield investments drastically.
9An example from the exporting literature is Bernard & Jensen (2004), who derive
an estimable equation of the export decision including past export status and firm fixed
effects in order to account for entry costs of exporting and unobserved heterogeneity.
10The categories would be: domestic firms, exporters only, exporters and cross-border
acquirers, exporters and firms engaged abroad via greenfield investments, firms without
exports, but with both types of FDI, and finally firms that choose all three modes of
foreign market entry.
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The next step consists in finding an appropriate industry classification that de-
fines industries with mobile and non-mobile capabilities. Nocke & Yeaple (2007)
themselves provide concrete examples for the concept of mobile and immobile
capabilities that determine the different selection patterns across industries. Mar-
keting expertise is of less value abroad as market conditions differ and existing
relationships to market participants provide an advantage in the home market only.
Such knowledge thus can be interpreted as immobile across countries. A firm’s
production technology, on the other hand, can be transferred relatively easily across
borders without losing its effectiveness. The operationalization of these capabili-
ties is not straightforward, though.
The balance sheet data at hand is not detailed enough to include marketing
expenditure or a similar measure for the importance of immobile capabilities nor
does it include a direct measure of firms’ R&D efforts or R&D output. Searching
for industry data from other sources, it appears to be difficult to find data at the
appropriately detailed level for all industries on both dimensions.
Therefore, I suggest a different measure for mobile capabilities that is directly
observable in the data, which is the share of intangible assets relative to the firm’s
non-financial fixed assets. At first sight, this does not seem to be a direct imple-
mentation of the theoretical distinction. Nocke & Yeaple (2007) clearly describe
that intangible assets determine the heterogeneity between firms, but they want to
stress the different types of intangible assets. According to international accounting
standards patents, licenses, and computer software are listed as intangible assets,
but also customer lists and supplier relationships. However, as the most important
feature that distinguishes the firms’ different assets is whether they can easily be
transfered to another firm, intangible assets might capture this distinction quite well
as they form exactly that part of firms’ assets that can be employed simultaneously
in more than one location. Combined with the foreign market-specific assets of the
target firm, the described complementarities can be exploited.
Hence, I rank the two-digit NACE industries according to their mean intan-
gible assets ratio. The top quartile of all industries is labeled ‘High intangibles
industry’. The resulting industry should correspond to the sector with mobile ca-
pabilities. The complementary category ‘Low intangibles industry’ subsumes the
rest of all industries, as a proxy for the sector in which non-mobile capabilities are
the relevant source of heterogeneity in the firms’ productivity. Manufacturing of
tobacco products, and research and development (NACE 16 and 73) are examples
from the manufacturing and service sector, respectively, for the former. Manufac-
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turing of plastic products or real estate activities (NACE 21 and 70), for instance,
belong to the low-intangibles group. The list of industries in the two categories is
given in table 3.1. Alternative industry classifications are considered as robustness
checks in section 3.5.
3.4 Results
Before looking at the results of the regression analysis, some descriptive facts are
presented. Table 3.2 displays the share of firms with different internationalization
statuses. Note that some firms may be included in more than one category. In the
dataset, 11.6% of all British firms in the sample export. This is higher compared
to numbers found for the U.S. (4% of all firms, compare Bernard et al., 2007a).
This reflects the coverage of the dataset, which is very comprehensive for larger
firms, while the smallest firms that are less likely to export are somewhat under-
represented. The shares considering manufacturing firms only or excluding small
firms are even higher (37.4%) and similar to other studies for the U.K., illustrating
the importance of data selection (Girma et al., 2004, for example, report a share
of 35%). The share of MNEs is considerably smaller with only 1.9% of all firms
and less than 5% even for large firms in the manufacturing industry. Finally, the
shares of cross-border acquirers and firms that engage in greenfield investment are
shown. These shares are less than one percent of all firms with even less acquirers
than greenfield investors.11
Table 3.3 provides unconditional means of some firm characteristics in the es-
timation sample for the year 2006.12 Domestic firms are smaller than future ex-
porters and those in turn are smaller than future MNEs, both in terms of sales and
employment. The difference between the two types of FDI firms is not very pro-
nounced. On average, exporters are also less productive than both cross-border
acquirers and firms engaged abroad via greenfield investments. Interestingly, firms
that have acquired a foreign target display the highest average share of intangible
investments, possibly indicating a complementary-asset seeking motive.
11Note that the numbers for the last two categories do not add up to the share of MNEs
measured as a stock variable illustrating the importance of the distinction between the
stock and flow of FDI.
12The total numbers of observations in the sample are 10,939, 393, and 3,183 for future
exporters, acquirers and greenfield firms, respectively.
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The estimation results are presented in table 3.4. The estimated coefficients
of equation 3.1 are shown in the upper panel separately for the low and high in-
tangibles sector, while the statistics of the tests on equality of the coefficients are
displayed below. In the regression for low intangibles industries, future exporting
firms display a medium productivity advantage of 7,2%. For greenfield investors,
the highest coefficient shows up (13,1%). The cross-border acquirer coefficient is
close to zero and not significant at any reasonable level. The productivity differ-
ences between groups are not statistically significant, though, due to the high stan-
dard error of the cross-border dummy, for which the number of ones is low. For
the high intangibles sample, contrasting results can be observed. Here, the group
of future cross-border acquirers has the highest and the only statistically significant
coefficient (44,3%), while the other two entry modes are not related to a notable
productivity advantage. The difference between exporters and greenfield investors
is again not significantly different from zero, but the null hypotheses of equality of
coefficients for the comparisons with cross-border acquirers can be rejected at the
1% level. The results are in line with the predictions of Nocke & Yeaple (2007),
as the high intangibles sector corresponds to the industry in which the firms’ het-
erogeneity is based on mobile capabilities, where the most efficient firms seek to
aquire complementary assets abroad. The heterogeneity that shows up in the results
is hidden in studies ignoring industry differences and the composition of FDI.
Figure 3.2 visualizes the productivity differences. The upper graph shows the
cumulative density functions of the firms’ productivity levels separately for each
internationalization mode in the low intangibles sector, the second graph refers to
the high intangibles industry. Here, I do not control for simultaneous use of more
than one entry mode. Without testing formally for stochastic dominance, inspect-
ing the location of the productivity distributions of the various entry modes gives a
more complete picture of the productivity differences as a ranking of the complete
distributions is established. The productivity distributions of exporters and green-
field investors is located clearly to the right of the domestic firms’ line in both
pictures, while the productivity distribution of the two modes is very close to each
other. The distribution for cross-border acquirers in the low intangible industries
is close to the distribution of exporters and greenfield investors and some quantiles
are almost the same as the corresponding values for domestic firms. This finding il-
lustrates why no significant productivity advantage of cross-border acquirers could
be found in the corresponding regression analysis. In the high intangibles sector, in
contrast, the productivity distribution of cross-border acquirers clearly dominates
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all other distributions. In addition to the mean, every quantile of the cross-border
acquirers’ productivity distribution is the largest compared to the rest of the firms
in the sample. The high coefficient in the regression approach seems not to arise
due to influential observations but rather reflects systematically higher productivity
levels of cross-border acquirers in the mobile capabilities industry.
An important issue for the discussion is whether the results are sensitive to-
wards the specific sample or measurement. For this discussion it appears to be
helpful to provide comparable results with previous empirical work.
Table 3.5 therefore shows estimation results if the heterogeneity of FDI modes
and industries is neglected. Future MNEs are defined as firms that are going to
acquire an additional affiliate in the upcoming three years. The results are similar
to the existing literature, as future exporters are more productive than domestic
firms, and future MNEs display even higher productivity levels (compare Arnold
& Hussinger, 2010; Girma et al., 2004, for example). The difference between
the estimated coefficients is significant at the 10% level. The known result that the
most productive firms become MNEs thus holds on average, but hides considerable
heterogeneity in the relation between a firm’s productivity and its mode of foreign
entry.
3.5 Robustness checks
In the estimations presented so far, a vector of control variables was always in-
cluded to filter out the pure productivity differences. To show that none of the
included firm characteristics has a strong enough influence to wipe out the ob-
served ranking, I estimate the raw productivity differences between the groups.
Therefore, only the post-entry dummies together with time and industry dummies,
but no controls for further firm characteristics are included in table 3.6. The esti-
mated coefficients turn out to be larger in size, but the productivity ranking itself
does not change. All firms active in international markets turn out to be signifi-
cantly more productive compared to their domestic counterparts, but partly only
due to their size, skill structure, and age. The productivity ranking of the groups of
international firms using different entry modes is not affected though.
Further, as the theoretical model strictly speaking refers to domestically owned
firms only, table 3.7 displays the results excluding firms with a majority foreign
shareholder. The estimations are again quite similar to the first set of results. While
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foreign owned firms are known to be more productive, this advantage seems not to
be systematically related to the sorting of firms into different internationalization
strategies.
Apart from the change in the estimation sample, I consider some changes in the
variable definitions. As described in the data section, the Olley & Pakes method
used to construct a consistent TFP measure takes care of some of the major esti-
mation problems, nevertheless it critically hinges on functional form restrictions
and instrument variables. Therefore, I also use labor productivity (total sales per
employee) as an alternative productivity measure (table 3.8), the residuals from a
simple OLS estimation of a Cobb-Douglas type production function (table 3.9),
and estimates including firm fixed effects (table 3.10).13 For these variations, I
do not include control variables as the results would be identical conditioning on
labor and capital input. The correlation between the various measures is always
higher than 0.9, thus causing no significant change in the described results. The
only exception is the latter version, where cross-border acquirers have a higher co-
efficient than exporters in the low intangible industry, however, the difference is
not statistically significant.
For reasons of comparability, in the baseline specification the exporter variable
is equal to one if the share of turnover resulting from export activities increased
significantly. Table 3.11 recalculates the results for the usual stock definition. That
is, the exporter dummy equals one for firms that are going to export and zero oth-
erwise. The coefficients and test statistics again almost do not change.
The next variations refer to alternatives to the chosen industry classification.
To check the sensitivity of the results towards the grouping of the industries (top-
quartile), I perform regressions that include all industries and I interact all foreign
entry dummy variables with the mean industry share of intangibles.
ln(TFPit) = β0 + βXXit + βCBCBit + βGIGIit + βmXXit ∗mj
+ βmCBCBit ∗mj + βmGIGIit ∗mj + βCit + γj + γt + εit(3.3)
where mj is the mean share of intangible assets relative to non-financial fixed
assets in a two-digit NACE industry. In this estimation, the interaction between
cross-border acquisitions and the mean ratio of intangible assets should have a
13Another measure would be value added per employee; unfortunately, value added is
rarely reported for British firms.
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positive coefficient, while the interaction terms with greenfield investments and ex-
porters are expected to be insignificant. Table 3.12 gives the respective estimates.
The coefficients on the pre-entry dummies are positive and significant for future
exporters and greenfield investors, while cross-border acquisitions are related to a
lower productivity. Looking at the interaction terms, however, the only positive,
large, and significant effect is found for cross-border acquirers in line with expec-
tations. To interpret the results in a meaningful way, the lowest and highest values
for the mean share of intangibles have to be considered to get the possible range of
the effect. The lowest intangibles ratio is 1.3%, while the sector with the highest
value reaches 11.2%. This results in a combined effect between -0.245 and 0.578,
implying cross-border acquirers to be the least productive firms in low intangibles
industries, but they are the most productive firms in industries with high intangi-
bles. This alternative specification thus again confirms the theoretical predictions.
As a further robustness check, I consider manufacturing firms separately from
the service industries. As for many services a more direct customer-producer in-
teraction is necessary, the relevant knowledge and technology in this sector might
be less mobile across borders than in manufacturing industries. Thus I expect the
results for the manufacturing to be similar to those in the mobile industry, whereas
the service sector should display similar patterns as the non-mobile sector. Table
3.13 gives the results for this alternative classification. The results are in line with
expectations, as in the manufacturing sector, the coefficients resemble the high in-
tangibles industry results except that exporters display a significant productivity
advantage in this case. The estimates of the service industries correspond to the in-
dustry where less mobile capabilities dominate. None of the t-tests on the pairwise
equality of the coefficients can be rejected, though.
Finally, I also use data on R&D and advertising intensity to explicitly take into
account the suggestions by Nocke & Yeaple (2007). I use the data from Peneder
(2002), who presents figures for industry R&D and advertising expenditures over
sales for the US economy at the three-digit NACE level, based on the assumption
that the US economy serves as a useful point of reference for its technological
leadership.14 This comes at the cost of restricting the sample to the manufactur-
ing sector only. The results for industries classified into those with low and high
14Data on R&D intensities for UK industries would be available, I do not find informa-
tion for the UK on the advertising intensities of the same industry classification.
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R&D and advertising ratios are shown in table 3.14 and 3.15, respectively.15 The
acquirers display the largest and significant coefficient both in the ‘High R&D in-
tensity’ and ‘High advertising intensity’ estimation, while the respective coefficient
is rather close to zero and not significant at any reasonable level in the remaining
columns. Thus, at least for manufacturing industries, the distinction of the under-
lying type of intangible asset seems to be less relevant. The classification referring
to the importance of intangible assets seems to be robust towards a finer differenti-
ation. As intangible assets can be transfered and employed at different firms at the
same time, they appear to be a good operationalization of the concept of mobile
capabilities.
15A simultaneous classification into high advertising/low R&D and high R&D/low ad-
vertising is not possible, as the low number of ones for cross-border deals does not lead to
any significant results.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the empirical literature on the determinants of international activity
at the firm level is extended towards different modes of FDI. While several em-
pirical studies confirm a productivity ranking based on Helpman et al. (2004), this
contribution shows that these results hold only on average for all types of FDI and
over all industries. In line with Nocke & Yeaple (2007), it matters whether MNEs
engage abroad via greenfield investments or cross-border acquisitions. Splitting
MNEs into acquirers of foreign firms and firms that build a new firm abroad re-
veals that in the U.K., acquirers in a cross-border deal are the most productive
firms in industries where intangible assets are high relative to non-financial fixed
assets, but they are the least productive group of all international active firms in
the complementary low intangibles industry group. Exporters and firms engaging
in greenfield investments display a productivity advantage over domestic firms of
similar size in both industries. Whether the higher intangibles stem from higher
R&D efforts or from higher marketing expenses seems not to be of primary im-
portance, at least for manufacturing industries. It is shown that these results are
not an artifact of the specific dataset as results comparable to the existing litera-
ture on MNEs can be produced. It should be taken into account that the motives
for firms choosing different internationalization forms potentially differ across in-
dustries and thus the effects of trade liberalization might vary across industries as
well.
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3.7 Tables
Figure 3.1
Schema of the productivity ranking.
Acquisition Export Greenfield
productivity
Export Greenfield Acquisition
productivity
Export FDI
productivity
Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004)
Nocke, Yeaple (2007) – Mobile capabilities industry
Nocke, Yeaple (2007) – Non-mobile capabilities industry
highlow
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Table 3.1
Examples for the industry classification.
Low intangibles industries
17 Manuf. of textiles
21 Manuf. of pulp, paper and paper products
25 Manuf. of rubber and plastic products
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
70 Real estate activities
High intangibles industries
16 Manuf. of tobacco products
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
24 Manuf. of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres
33 Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
52 Retail trade
73 Research and Development
The complete list of two-digit NACE codes of the high intangibles category: 16, 22, 23,
24, 90, 33, 34, 41, 52, 55, 73. The remaining industries fall in the low intangibles category.
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Table 3.2
Share of firms according to their internationalization status
in 2006 (in %).
Exporters
All firms 11.6
Manufacturing firms 32.6
Firms > 10 employees 17.2
Manufacturing firms > 10 employees 37.4
MNEs (stock of foreign affiliates)
All firms 1.9
Manufacturing firms 4.1
Firms > 10 employees 2.7
Manufacturing firms > 10 employees 4.4
Cross-border acquirers
All firms 0.09
Manufacturing firms 0.11
Firms with more than 10 employees 0.12
Manufacturing firms > 10 employees 0.12
Greenfield investors
All firms 0.7
Manufacturing firms 1.6
Firms with more than 10 employees 1.0
Manufacturing firms > 10 employees 1.7
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Table 3.3
Descriptive statistics of the different firm groups
in 2006.
Domestic Cross-border Greenfield
firms Exporters acquirers investors
United Kingdom
Log sales 7.867 9.200 10.620 10.384
Log employment 3.045 3.857 5.179 4.81
Log TFP 0.826 1.455 1.722 1.804
Share of intangibles 0.051 0.094 0.222 0.143
N (firm-year observations) 174,275 379 30 268
Unconditional means. Calculations are based on the three years before entering the
respective status via the respective internationalization mode. TFP: Olley & Pakes
(1996) algorithm. Share of intangibles: intangible assets over non-financial fixed assets.
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Table 3.4
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Classification: industry share of intangible assets.
Low intangibles High intangibles
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.072*** -0.003
(0.012) (0.032)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.003 0.443***
(0.073) (0.118)
Future greenfield investor 0.131*** 0.001
(0.025) (0.044)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer 0.069 -0.446***
(0.075) (0.121)
Future exporter = Future greenfield -0.059** -0.004
(0.027) (0.056)
Future acquirer = Future greenfield -0.128 0.442***
(0.079) (0.123)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adjusted R2 0.467 0.553
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance levels 1,
5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number of employees
squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder dummy,
legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenfield
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coef-
ficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coefficient, pre-exporting dummy coefficient
is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient, and pre-cross-border dummy
coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient. Sectors are classified
according to their mean share of intangible assets over non-financial fixed assets. High
intangibles industries are the top quartile of all industries ranked by their respective
mean share.
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Figure 3.2
Cumulative distribution functions of the firms’ productivity
by foreign entry mode and industry.
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Table 3.5
Ignoring heterogeneity.
Estimated coefficients
Future exporting firm 0.063***
(0.011)
Future MNE 0.107***
(0.022)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future MNE -0.044*
(0.025)
Past international activity Yes
Control variables Yes
Industry and time effects Yes
N 249,014
adjusted R2 0.478
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance levels 1,
5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number of employees
squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder dummy,
legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter and MNE dummies, and a set of time
and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided
t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-FDI dummy
coefficient.
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Table 3.6
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Only controlling for year and industry.
Low intangibles High intangibles
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.292*** 0.106***
(0.013) (0.036)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.287*** 0.671***
(0.085) (0.147)
Future greenfield investor 0.459*** 0.291***
(0.028) (0.053)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer 0.005 -0.565***
(0.086) (0.150)
Future exporter = Future greenfield -0.167*** -0.185***
(0.031) (0.066)
Future acquirer = Future greenfield -0.172* 0.380**
(0.090) (0.158)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables No No
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adjusted R2 0.184 0.261
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance levels
1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-
greenfield investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting
dummy coefficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coefficient, pre-exporting dummy
coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient, and pre-cross-border
dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient.
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Table 3.7
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Only domestic firms.
Low intangibles High intangibles
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.073*** -0.023
(0.013) (0.040)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.010 0.380***
(0.076) (0.115)
Future greenfield investor 0.142*** 0.010
(0.028) (0.051)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer 0.062 -0.403***
(0.078) (0.122)
Future exporter = Future greenfield -0.069** -0.033
(0.031) (0.067)
Future acquirer = Future greenfield -0.132 0.370***
(0.083) (0.123)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 181,298 31,278
adjusted R2 0.472 0.545
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance levels 1,
5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number of employees
squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder dummy,
legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenfield
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coef-
ficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coefficient, pre-exporting dummy coefficient
is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient, and pre-cross-border dummy
coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient. Sample excluding
firms with a foreign majority shareholder.
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Table 3.8
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Labor productivity.
Low intangibles High intangibles
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.240*** 0.093**
(0.013) (0.037)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.161* 0.581***
(0.083) (0.153)
Future greenfield investor 0.313*** 0.118**
(0.027) (0.051)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer 0.078 -0.488***
(0.084) (0.155)
Future exporter = Future greenfield -0.074** -0.025
(0.031) (0.064)
Future acquirer = Future greenfield -0.152* 0.463***
(0.089) (0.162)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adjusted R2 0.174 0.259
Coefficients from an OLS regression with log labor productivity as the dependent variable
(estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance levels 1, 5,
10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number of employees
squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder dummy,
legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenfield
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coef-
ficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coefficient, pre-exporting dummy coefficient
is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient, and pre-cross-border dummy
coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient. Sectors are classified
according to their mean share of intangible assets over non-financial fixed assets. High
intangibles industries are the top quartile of all industries ranked by their respective
mean share.
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Table 3.9
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Productivity estimation with OLS.
Low intangibles High intangibles
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.214*** 0.090**
(0.013) (0.038)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.115 0.526***
(0.080) (0.160)
Future greenfield investor 0.246*** 0.046
(0.027) (0.051)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer 0.099 -0.436***
(0.081) (0.162)
Future exporter = Future greenfield -0.032 0.044
(0.031) (0.064)
Future acquirer = Future greenfield -0.132 0.479***
(0.171) (0.277)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adjusted R2 0.400 0.503
Coefficients from an OLS regression with the residual from a OLS productivity estimation
as the dependent variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, *
denote significance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of
employees, log number of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log
age, foreign majority shareholder dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter,
post-cross-border deal and post-greenfield investment dummies, and a set of time and
two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test
with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy
coefficient, pre-exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy
coefficient, and pre-cross-border dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment
dummy coefficient. Sectors are classified according to their mean share of intangible
assets over non-financial fixed assets. High intangibles industries are the top quartile of
all industries ranked by their respective mean share.
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Table 3.10
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Productivity estimation with fixed effects.
Low intangibles High intangibles
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.342*** 0.126***
(0.014) (0.038)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.405*** 0.745***
(0.088) (0.153)
Future greenfield investor 0.590*** 0.440***
(0.029) (0.059)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer -0.064 -0.619***
(0.089) (0.156)
Future exporter = Future greenfield -0.249*** -0.315***
(0.032) (0.071)
Future acquirer = Future greenfield -0.185** 0.304*
(0.094) (0.166)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adjusted R2 0.186 0.252
Coefficients from an OLS regression with the residual from a productivity estimation in-
cluding fixed effects as the dependent variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses).
***, **, * denote significance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: exporter,
post-cross-border deal and post-greenfield investment dummies, and a set of time and
two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test
with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy
coefficient, pre-exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy
coefficient, and pre-cross-border dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment
dummy coefficient. Sectors are classified according to their mean share of intangible
assets over non-financial fixed assets. High intangibles industries are the top quartile of
all industries ranked by their respective mean share.
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Table 3.11
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Alternative exporter definition.
Low intangibles High intangibles
Estimated coefficients
Future exporting firm 0.086*** 0.052
(0.014) (0.034)
Future cross-border acquirer -0.004 0.424***
(0.074) (0.125)
Future greenfield investor 0.120*** -0.019
(0.025) (0.045)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer 0.090 -0.372***
(0.075) (0.130)
Future exporter = Future greenfield -0.033** 0.071*
(0.028) (0.058)
Future acquirer = Future greenfield -0.124* 0.443
(0.079) (0.130)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adjusted R2 0.468 0.555
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). Exporter dummy equals one if firm
starts to export within the next three years. ***, **, * denote significance levels 1, 5,
10%, respectively. Control variables: exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenfield
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coef-
ficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coefficient, pre-exporting dummy coefficient
is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient, and pre-cross-border dummy
coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient. Sectors are classified
according to their mean share of intangible assets over non-financial fixed assets. High
intangibles industries are the top quartile of all industries ranked by their respective
mean share.
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Table 3.12
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Interaction with industry share of intangible assets.
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.105***
(0.036)
Future cross-border acquirer -0.354*
(0.190)
Future greenfield investor 0.130**
(0.063)
Future export expanding firm -0.817
*mean R&D (0.678)
Future cross-border acquirer 8.325**
*mean R&D (3.470)
Future greenfield investor -0.377
*mean R&D (1.070)
Past international activity Yes
Control variables Yes
Industry and time effects Yes
N 249,014
adjusted R2 0.478
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance levels
1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number of
employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority share-
holder dummy. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypotheses
pre-internationalization dummy coefficient and interaction term coefficient jointly equal
to zero.
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Table 3.13
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Manufacturing and service industries.
Services Manufacturing
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.075*** 0.039***
(0.016) (0.014)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.009 0.176**
(0.089) (0.077)
Future greenfield investor 0.141*** 0.035
(0.030) (0.028)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer 0.066 -0.137*
(0.091) (0.078)
Future exporter = Future greenfield -0.066* 0.004
(0.034) (0.032)
Future acquirer = Future greenfield -0.133 0.141*
(0.096) (0.082)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 195,193 53,821
adjusted R2 0.488 0.417
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance
levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number
of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority
shareholder dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border
deal and post-greenfield investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE
industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis
pre-exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coefficient, pre-
exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient,
and pre-cross-border dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy
coefficient. Manufacturing industries: two-digit NACE codes 15-37.
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Table 3.14
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
R&D intensity (manufacturing only).
Low R&D High R&D
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.059*** -0.006
(0.016) (0.027)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.006 0.318***
(0.090) (0.111)
Future greenfield investor 0.055* -0.004
(0.031) (0.050)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer 0.053 -0.324***
(0.092) (0.114)
Future exporter = Future Greenfield 0.003 -0.002
(0.035) (0.058)
Future acquirer = Future Greenfield -0.049 0.321***
(0.097) (0.119)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 37,490 15,940
adjusted R2 0.434 0.394
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance
levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number
of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority
shareholder dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border
deal and post-greenfield investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE
industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis
pre-exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coefficient, pre-
exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient,
and pre-cross-border dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy
coefficient. Manufacturing industries: two-digit NACE codes 15-37.
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Table 3.15
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Advertising intensity (manufacturing only).
Low advertising High advertising
Estimated coefficients
Future export expanding firm 0.011 0.135***
(0.016) (0.031)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.039 0.452***
(0.071) (0.153)
Future greenfield investor 0.015 0.089*
(0.033) (0.050)
Test of equality of coefficients
Future exporter = Future acquirer -0.028 -0.317**
(0.073) (0.156)
Future exporter = Future Greenfield -0.004 0.046
(0.037) (0.058)
Future acquirer = Future Greenfield 0.023 0.364**
(0.081) (0.158)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time effects Yes Yes
N 38,311 15,119
adjusted R2 0.402 0.470
Coefficients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent
variable (estimated standard errors in parentheses). ***, **, * denote significance
levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number
of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority
shareholder dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border
deal and post-greenfield investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE
industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis
pre-exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coefficient, pre-
exporting dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy coefficient,
and pre-cross-border dummy coefficient is equal to pre-greenfield investment dummy
coefficient. Manufacturing industries: two-digit NACE codes 15-37.
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Chapter 4
Who buys who in international
trade
4.1 Introduction
Firm heterogeneity has dominated international trade theory and empirics more
than any other topic in the last decade. Today, the selection of firms into differ-
ent types of international activities according to their size, productivity, and other
characteristics has become a stylized fact. Only the best firms within an industry
become MNEs, while the second best firms find it more profitable to export their
goods to the foreign market, and the less productive firms serve the domestic mar-
ket only (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004; Bernard et al., 2007b). In addition,
several papers indicate that firms acquired by foreign owners are not a random
sample either. In contrast, foreign-owned firms are often shown to outperform do-
mestic firms of the same industry. At least part of this superior performance seems
to arise because multinationals cherry-pick better than average firms as potential
acquisition targets (Almeida, 2007; Arnold & Javorcik, 2009). These two aspects,
however, are usually addressed separately in the literature. Using a European firm-
level dataset in combination with a global M&A database, I am able to analyze the
complete sorting of acquirers and targets and to compare the ranking for national
and cross-border acquisitions. Further, I link directly acquirers to their respective
target firms, which allows me to provide first evidence on the question of who buys
who in international trade.
In the finance literature, that traditionally focuses on national mergers and ac-
quisitions, the debate of who buys who has been discussed since the first larger
wave of M&As in the 1980s, and the issue remained an active research question
ever since. While Jovanovic & Rousseau (2002) describe in their q-theory of merg-
ers how firms with high market-to-book ratios exploit their advantage to buy un-
dervalued firms, Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson (2008) suggest that firms with rather
similar market-to-book values tend to merge. In contrast to these studies, Mak-
simovic & Phillips (2001) focus on the productivity of the merging parties and
confirm a reallocation of resources from inefficient to better firms. Yang (2008),
finally, adds another dimension to the problem and shows that changes in produc-
tivity rather than productivity levels are important determinants of real asset sales
and acquisitions. Firms experiencing positive productivity growth typically acquire
firms, while firms with decreasing productivity sell off their assets.
No comparable study exists with a particular focus on international acquisi-
tions. Most trade models that incorporate heterogeneous firms and MNEs assume
that all FDI are greenfield investments (Helpman et al., 2004; Neary, 2007). No
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predictions are made regarding who buys who. One of the few theoretical papers
that looks at cross-border acquisitions in an international trade model explicitly is
Nocke & Yeaple (2007). They stress the access to complementary assets as the
motivation for M&A across borders. Cross-border acquirers can be at the upper or
lower range of the productivity distribution of internationally active firms depend-
ing on industry characteristics. The predictions regarding who buys who is not ad-
dressed explicitly, however, as the better of the two merging firms is exogenously
defined to be the acquirer in the deal. In the model of Neary (2007), strategic con-
siderations of the firms result in merger waves, in which high efficiency firms buy
less efficient foreign firms contributing to the specialization of countries in activi-
ties in which they have a comparative advantage. However, firms within industries
are not heterogeneous. Breinlich (2008) examines the impact of trade liberalization
on national and cross-border M&A activities in North America. He finds that on
average, acquirers are more productive than targets, except for acquisitions of U.S.
targets by Canadian firms. However, he looks at the differences ex-post and does
not link the two sides of the deals directly.
The present paper extends and contributes to both strands of literature. En-
riching a European M&A database with firm characteristics of both the acquiring
firms and the corresponding acquisition targets, I am able to analyze both sides of
European cross-border acquisitions simultaneously in one linked dataset. I further
add a large random sample of firms that are not involved in any M&A deal over
the period of observation as a control group to account for country and industry
differences.
The novel features of the analyses are, first, that I am able provide the com-
plete ranking of acquirer and target firms compared to a large sample of non-
participating control firms for a series of performance measures. Second, as my
sample is not restricted to one country only, the results regarding the selection
of acquirers and picking of targets are more reliable than in studies based on a
single country. Third, I focus on the explicit match of acquirer and target firms ac-
cording to their pre-acquisition characteristics, which provides a direct comparison
between the participating parties. The analysis thus extends the question of who
buys who to international acquisitions. Finally, differences between national and
cross-border deals are considered.
Heterogeneity in the pre-acquisition performance differences between acquirer
and target firms can help to explain why the empirical work on spillover effects
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of foreign firms on domestic target firms has not provided consistent results so
far. Maksimovic & Phillips (2001) note that productivity improvements depend on
the superior technology of the acquiring firm. As the effect of foreign ownership
probably depends on the actual productivity edge of the acquiring firm, the analysis
of the actual combinations of targets and acquirers can help to explain the observed
heterogeneous effects of foreign acquisitions.
In line with previous work, I find robust evidence both for the selection of the
best acquirers and the cherry picking of above-average target firms according to
several performance measures. Cross-border acquirers are on average larger and
more productive than target firms and those are again better than domestic firms not
involved in any acquisition. The ranking of acquirer and target firms holds also for
national deals, but on a lower level. Additionally, acquirers are firms that grow in
size, while in national deals, firms with an on average positive productivity change
are taken over.
With the direct link of firms involved in a deal, I find that the performance dif-
ferences between acquirers and targets are quite heterogeneous. On average, larger
and more productive firms acquire smaller firms. The performance difference is
smaller for domestic deals. The distribution of acquirer-target difference is more
concentrated around zero for domestic deals, while size differences in cross-border
M&As appear to be more heterogeneous and are also more often positive than in
national acquisitions. The results suggest that “high buys less high” might be the
best characterization of firm matches in cross-border acquisitions, while “like buys
like” is more typical for national deals. Although it seems to be more frequent in in-
ternational M&A deals that efficient firms pick less efficient still but above-average
performing targets, there is a large heterogeneity in the matches of acquirers and
target firms.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes the existing lit-
erature. In section 4.3, the construction of the dataset is described, the variable
definitions can be found in section 4.4 and section 4.6 discusses the results. The
last section concludes the paper.
4.2 Related literature
The question of who buys who has a long tradition in the finance literature. The
view that acquirers are better than their targets goes back to the work of Manne
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(1965). He sees mergers as an alternative to bankruptcy and liquidation through
which badly managed, low valued resources are reallocated to more efficient man-
agements. Similarly, Jovanovic & Rousseau (2002) use the well-established q-
theory of investments to explain why mergers occur. They see mergers as a type of
investment that provides an alternative to purchasing disassembled capital. Firms
with high market-to-book ratios should invest in firms with less growth opportuni-
ties, reflected in lower valuations, as they are able to transfer their higher efficiency
to the acquired assets. The idea of mergers as reallocation of assets to more efficient
uses results in the prediction that "high buys low". Andrade et al. (2001) support
these findings stating that more than 60% of all deals involve acquirers with higher
market-to-book ratios compared to the respective targets, and the median relative
size is between 10 to 13%.
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), on the other hand, question this view by their em-
pirical evidence of U.S. domestic mergers. They indeed find that acquirers’ val-
uations are on average higher than target firms’ valuations. However, targets are
also valued significantly higher compared to domestic firms. They suggest that
"high buys less high" instead of "high buys low" might be a better description
of the firms’ sorting pattern. Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson (2008) formulate even
stronger results: they show that on average, targets and acquirers are quite simi-
lar to each other and propose "high buys high, moderate buys moderate, and low
buys low" (p.1170) or "like buys like" to best describe the observed sorting mecha-
nism. They offer a new theory of mergers that assumes that complementary assets
should be bound together within a firm to reduce hold-up problems and underin-
vestment in the spirit of the well-known property rights approach. To realize the
gains from complementary assets, firms have to negotiate with potential merger
partners. Firms have to trade off higher gains from a better match with the reduced
bargaining power in a merger process with a better partner. In the end, similar firms
in terms of various dimensions will decide to combine their assets in a merger. The
authors test the predictions of this model again using market-to-book-ratios. While
the average valuation is higher for acquirers than for targets, examining the com-
plete distribution reveals that the most frequent transaction type involves firms in
the same range of the distribution of market-to-book ratios.
The model allows to make an interesting prediction for cross-border as op-
posed to national acquisitions. The acquirer-target differences in market-to-book
ratios are expected to be smaller, the lower the search costs for a matching firm.
Searching for suitable targets should be much more costly at a international scale
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than looking for the best match in the domestic market only. The "like buys like"
effect should therefore be less pronounced in cross-border acquisitions compared
to domestic deals.
A major drawback of the analyses of market-to-book ratios is the restriction to
publicly listed firms. Only for those firms, the valuations can be derived from stock
market data. Furthermore, as Maksimovic & Phillips (2001) point out, looking at
productivity directly has the additional advantage compared to analyses of stock
market data that market responses to the transaction and expectations of future
effects on the merger parties’ performance are not reflected in the measure but
only actual productivity changes are considered (compare footnotes 6 and 8).
There are not many theoretical papers that explicitly take into account cross-
border M&A, and to the best of my knowledge, there is no model that predicts
the match between heterogeneous acquirers and their foreign acquisition targets
endogenously.1 One of the few theoretical papers that looks explicitly at cross-
border acquisitions in an international trade model is Neary (2007). In his model,
strategic considerations build the motivation for cross-border acquisitions for firms
that compete in oligopolistic markets. He shows how merger waves emerge, in
which high efficiency firms buy less efficient foreign firms contributing to the spe-
cialization of countries in activities in which they have a comparative advantage.
While the model predicts a productivity advantage for foreign acquirers even in
the absence of efficiency gains as a specific motive for the deal, his model does
not feature within industry heterogeneity of firms. If one firm is taken over in an
industry, all firms will be acquisition targets in the following merger wave.
Access to complementary technology is the main motivation for firms to en-
ter the foreign market in the model of foreign market entry by Nocke & Yeaple
(2007). In their model, firms of an industry are heterogeneous in their observed
productivity due to differences in capabilities that are more or less mobile across
borders, such as technological know-how or marketing skills, respectively. Do-
mestic and cross-border mergers provide opportunities for firms to get access to
location-specific assets that they can combine with their own capabilities. The pre-
dictions of the model regarding the efficiency of target firms differs depending on
the type of industry considered. While targets in domestic and cross-border ac-
1There is a significant literature that looks at the effects of tariffs and trade liberaliza-
tions and merger policy on the choice of FDI mode. These models usually do not account
for within industry firm heterogeneity.
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quisitions should not differ in industries where internationally mobile capabilities
matter most, foreign acquirers are predicted to be more efficient on average than
domestic acquirers. In industries where within-industry productivity differences
can be traced back to differences in non-mobile capabilities, in contrast, domestic
targets are endowed with better capabilities compared to their cross-border coun-
terparts, but the ranking of acquirers remains the same. Regarding the direct link
between acquirers and targets, the model provides no testable predictions. Exoge-
nously, the more productive firm is defined to be the acquirer.
Empirical evidence that is most related to this paper is provided by Breinlich
(2008), who looks at domestic and cross-border acquisitions between Canadian
and U.S. firms after trade liberalizations. He finds that on average acquirers are
larger than target firms, whereas productivity differences appear to be less pro-
nounced. He argues that this is generally in favor of the reallocation to efficient
uses hypothesis. He also acknowledges that additional motives such as access to
superior technology might overlap this regularity in some cases, as U.S. targets of
Canadian acquirers tend to be smaller, but more productive. However, he looks at
the differences ex-post and does not link the two sides of the deals directly. Further,
the sample for this part of the analysis is also restricted to publicly traded firms.
The selection of firms into different types of international activities according
to their size, productivity, and other characteristics is now well documented. Fol-
lowing the "new, new trade theory" (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004), only the
best firms within an industry become MNEs, while the second to best firms find it
more profitable to export their goods to the foreign market, and the less productive
firms serve the domestic market only.2
More recent work focuses on different types of foreign direct investment, namely
cross-border M&As and greenfield entry. Nocke & Yeaple (2008) and Raff et al.
(2012) compare both types of foreign market entry and find on average more pro-
ductive firms to choose greenfield entry over acquisitions, while Trax (2011) shows
for a British sample that the productivity ranking varies across industry types. Ac-
quirers are the most productive firms in industries with a high ratio of intangible
assets, but in other industries they are the least productive of all internationally
active firms.
2see overview and survey by Bernard & Jensen (2007); Greenaway & Kneller (2007),
for example, and Girma et al. (2005); Jäckle & Wamser (2010); Damijan et al. (2007) for
more recent evidence on the productivity advantage of future multinational firms
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In addition, several papers indicate that firms acquired by foreign owners are
not a random sample either. In contrast, foreign-owned firms tend to outperform
domestic firms of the same industry. Arnold & Javorcik (2009) named Indonesian
targets of foreign owners “gifted kids”, as at least part of their performance pre-
mium seems to arise because multinationals cherry-pick better than average firms
as potential acquisition targets. Several other studies document cherry picking of
productive firms by foreign new owners.3
Gioia & Thomsen (2004), in contrast, describe a lemon-picking behavior of
foreign acquirers compared to domestic owners in Denmark. Conyon et al. (2002b)
finds that in acquisitions of U.K. targets, both domestic and foreign acquirers
choose plants with below-average size, but the effect is smaller for international
acquisitions. They also provide descriptive evidence that both types of acquirers
choose firms with positive employment and labor productivity growth, and this
selection on productivity growth is stronger for targets of international investors.
There are not many papers that compare international with domestic acquisi-
tions explicitly. Hanley & Zervos (2007) and Bertrand & Zitouna (2008) show
that in contrast to domestic acquirers, foreign owners select their targets based
on above average performance. For Norwegian manufacturing firms, Balsvik &
Haller (2010) analyze pre-acquisition employment, wage, and productivity levels.
They find that foreign new owners acquire large, productive, and also high-wage
plants, while domestic acquirers also select bigger targets, but with only average
productivity.
4.3 Data
The dataset for this study on both sides of cross-border investments is an innovative
combination of a global M&A database with a European firm-level dataset. Next to
various deal characteristics, the M&A database provides information on the firms
involved in each deal. With this link between the two sides of a deal, the balance
sheet data is merged twice to the list of M&A deals, first for the acquirer and second
for the corresponding target firms. This combined dataset is then complemented
3McGuckin & Nguyen (1995) for targeted U.S. firms, Harris & Robinson (2002), Girma
& Görg (2007) and Criscuolo & Martin (2009) for British firms, Almeida (2007) looks at
Portuguese firms, and Karpaty (2007) for Swedish targets.
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with an extensive random sample of control firms that are not involved in any
acquisition in the period of observation. Table 4.1 shows the stylized structure of
the resulting final dataset.
The transaction data is extracted from the Zephyr database that is published
by Bureau van Dijk. The data are collected from company reports, regional infor-
mation providers, consulting firms, and press releases. Zephyr includes data on a
wide range of transactions, including M&A deals. It provides information about
the date and value of a deal, the source of financing as well as a description of the
type of transaction. Most importantly, it lists all firms that are involved in a deal.
In the sample, I include only completed deals in which the acquirer gains a
majority interest. Furthermore, I exclude deals for which more than one acquirer
is named. In cases where a acquirer consortium is listed that consists of one non-
financial acquirer and financial firms, I do include the deal and refer to the charac-
teristics of the non-financial acquirer. If the only acquirer belongs to the financial
sector, the deal is dropped from the sample. There are some deals reported, in
which more than one target is acquired at the same time, I treat those deals as
separate deals for each target. Finally, I exclude acquisitions if firms change their
majority owner more than once within one year, as determinants and effects of the
single acquisitions could be confounded.
The firm data is taken from the Amadeus database that stems from the same
data provider. Amadeus is a European firm-level dataset and it provides informa-
tion on firms’ balance sheets, and profit and loss accounts for up to ten years.4 The
data is collected from company reports that are supplemented by specialized re-
gional information providers. For a cross-country study that links firms located in
different countries, Amadeus has the important advantage that the process of data
collection is as homogeneous as possible across countries.
A fundamental feature of the data is the availability of unconsolidated accounts
that display balance sheet items separately for the single firm. As this is a neces-
sary pre-condition for comparing acquirer and target characteristics, only firms for
which unconsolidated balance sheet data are available are included in the sample.
Firms that are active in the primary sector, holding companies (NACE code 7415),
and firms from the public sector (NACE 75, 91) are deleted. I also exclude financial
companies (NACE 65-67) as the definition of output or sales and is not comparable
4Eight yearly updates are merged for this analysis for the years 2000-2007.
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to other firms. I further delete observations with implausible values such as nega-
tive input factors and with growth rates larger than the highest and smaller than the
first 200-quantile, as those large changes might indicate unreported merger activity
or other forms of organizational restructuring.
The Amadeus firm-level data has been analyzed in the empirical FDI literature
quite frequently (see Egger et al., 2010; Helpman et al., 2004, as examples), the
link to the merger information of Zephyr has been used by Stiebale & Trax (2011)
and Trax (2011). The major advantage is the broad coverage of the dataset. A
particularly interesting feature is the inclusion of non-listed firms, a restriction of
several other datasets focusing on merger and acquisitions.
As typical for most firm-level datasets, the sample is somewhat biased towards
the larger firms of the respective economies. While the smallest firms are typically
not involved in acquisitions, deals where either the target or acquirer is relatively
small might thus be not included. Nonetheless, it has been found that the sectoral
and aggregate distribution of firm size and employment growth rates follow those
from national labor force surveys and the OECD Stan database quite closely (see
Messina & Vallanti, 2007, for instance).
A more serious problem arises with the link between target and acquirer infor-
mation. One limitation of the Amadeus database is that values for key variables
like sales, employment, or financial indicators are missing for some companies.
Deals can only be included in the sample if all information for both acquirers and
targets is available at the same time. The missing value problem is thus multiplied,
which reduces the final sample size considerably. I therefore restrict the analysis
to variables for which the missing value problem is less severe.5
Using the comprehensive information of the M&A database, I first identify
which firms belong to the group of cross-border acquirers, cross-border targets,
domestic acquirers, and domestic targets. Excluding all firms that appear at some
point in time in the Zephyr database from the firm dataset, I draw a large random
sample of domestic firms form a suitable control group. The number of control
firms is proportional to the number of M&A participants in each country, industry,
and year cell. The procedure ensures that for each deal enough observations are
available while the size of the dataset remains manageable at the same time.
5For the same reason I cannot estimate the effects of acquisitions on the participating
firms, as the sample shrinks even more when several years of observations are needed. In
addition, for many targets no information is available after the acquisition.
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4.4 Variables
In the analysis, I do not rely on one measure of productivity, but rather on a set
of variables that measure firm size and technology. All variables are interesting
in their own, but together, they create a broader picture of the factors driving the
firms’ internationalization decision.
The list of variables includes sales, employment, and capital to measure the
firms’ size in different dimensions. Capital is measured as non-financial fixed as-
sets, employment is the headcount of employees, and the sales figure is the firms’
reported turnover. The technology of the different groups of firms is characterized
with their observed labor productivity, capital intensity, and total factor produc-
tivity (TFP). The TFP measure is calculated as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas
production function, with the coefficients estimated with OLS. In addition to the
standard inputs capital and labor, I control for the age and legal form of the firm,
and I include dummy variables for industry, country, and year effects in the pro-
duction function estimation.6 All variables are used in logarithmic form. Next to
the analysis of the performance measures in levels, I also consider performance
changes. The log growth rate of each variable is constructed taking the difference
between the logarithm in the year of interest minus the logarithm of the value that
the respective variable takes on in the previous year.7
As further control variables, I generate the age of the firm as the number of
years since incorporation that can be interpreted as a reflection of learning (Jo-
vanovic, 1982) and is included as a control for growth potentials and experience.
In addition, a dummy controlling for the legal form equals one if the acquirer is a
public limited company. Differences in technological opportunities and the com-
petitive environment are accounted for by industry dummies at the NACE two-digit
industry level. Country specificities are captured by country fixed effects. A set of
time dummies captures macroeconomic factors such as changes in the business
cycle or exchange rate movements.
6I use this simple TFP measure, as the use of the procedures of Olley & Pakes (1996);
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) is impeded by differences in the availability of certain variables
across countries. The same is true for value added as an alternative outcome variable.
7Log growth rates have the advantage that they are symmetric. Growth rates of the
form (xt − xt−1)/xt−1 results in different values for an absolute increase and decrease of
the variable of identical size, which is problematic in the calculation of averages.
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The sample consists of firms from different countries and industries, and in-
cludes several years. Any absolute differences between firms would be hard to
interpret in a meaningful way due to country, industry, and year effects. Moreover,
the heterogeneous firms models usually refer to within industry variations in the
firms’ performance. To account for country, industry, and year specific effects, I
include the appropriate sets of dummy variables in the estimations. For descriptive
analyses and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, I construct z-scores for all variables, a
dimensionless measure that is better comparable across firms.8
z(xit) =
xit −m(xcjkt)
sd(xcjkt)
, (4.1)
with z(xit) the calculated z-score of variable xit for firm i in industry j, in
country k, and year t. A z-score is a transformation that centers the distribution
of a variable around zero and normalizes it with the variable’s standard deviation.
That is, I calculate for all variables the respective means m(xcjkt) and standard
deviations sd(xcjkt) for all country, industry, and year cells. The calculations are
based exclusively on the observations of the control sample. The interpretation of
the generated z-scores is thus the following. What is the distance of the respective
observation to the sample mean of the control firms in the firms’ country, industry,
and year cell in numbers of standard deviations. It gives us the position of the
observation in the within country-industry distribution of non-merging firms in a
given year. This normalization makes the variables comparable across countries.
The panel structure of the data allows to focus on pre-acquisition characteristics
in the years before the actual merger takes place. This is important to make sure
that the selection of firms is captured, but not the reverse effects of M&As on char-
acteristics of the participating firms (Bernard & Jensen, 1999). As the accounting-
based variables used in the analysis might be affected by the firms’ merger activity,
using contemporaneous values of the performance measures is inappropriate as it
would introduce spurious correlation (Andrade & Stafford, 2004). All explanatory
variables are thus always as of the beginning of the period, i.e. lagged by one year.
8As the population means and standard deviations are not known, the sample analogues
from the random control sample are used. This transformation more exactly should be
called a t-statistic. However, with large sample sizes, the t-statistic is asymptotically
normally distributed and the term z-scores is normally used in the literature.
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4.5 Estimation
In the literature that tests performance premia of different firm groups, two ap-
proaches co-exist. The productivity advantages are easily estimated in a regression
of the respective performance measure on a set of dummies for each type of firm
as in Bernard & Jensen (1999) and Head & Ries (2003). The alternative strategy
is to test for differences in the productivity distributions between groups of firms
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test similar to Delgado et al. (2002) and Girma et al.
(2005). The first variant gives better insights in the size of the premium. The latter
approach has the advantage that the non-parametric test is not restricted to the sam-
ple mean, but takes the complete distribution of the tested variables into account.
As both methods have their own advantages, I decide to perform both approaches.
First, I estimate the following equation for each performance measure x:
ln(xit) = α0 + α1CBACit + α2CBTAit + α3NAACit + α4NATAit
+ γj + γk + γt + εit, (4.2)
where CBACit refers to cross-border acquirers, CBTAit to targets in a cross-
border deal,NAACit to firms engaged as acquirers in national deals, andNATAit
are the respective national targets. The reference category is formed by the control
firms that are not involved in any merger activity in the observation period. Dummy
variable sets for countries, industries, and years are included so that the compar-
isons across firm groups refer to within industry differences. As stressed earlier,
the equation refers strictly to the period before the actual merger takes place to
single out the selection of firms.
The estimated coefficients αk of the firm type dummies reflect the performance
premium of the corresponding group of firms in comparison to the control group
that is not involved in any merger activity. To test whether firms of group k are
significantly more or less productive than firms in group l, two-sided t-tests of the
following null hypothesis are performed:
H0 : αl − αk = 0, (4.3)
where αk and αl are the estimated coefficients and k, l ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4. If the null
hypothesis of no differences can be rejected, the performance premia for the re-
spective firm types differ significantly from each other.
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The second approach compares the complete distribution of the performance
measures across firm groups. The non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test relies
on the concept of first-order stochastic dominance and establishes a ranking for
the compared distributions. Given the empirical cumulative distribution functions
of the performance measure x of two groups of firms, F (x) and G(x), stochastic
dominance of F (x) over G(x) implies that F (x)−G(x) ≤ 0 over x, and F (x)−
G(x) < 0 for at least some x.
Following Delgado et al. (2002) and others, two tests are needed to establish
stochastic dominance of one distribution over another. The two-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on equality of distributions has the following null-hypothesis:
H0 : F (x)−G(x) = 0 for all x ; H1 : F (x)−G(x) 6= 0 for some x.
(4.4)
If the two distributions are not identical, the null of this test is rejected. If this is
the case, we look at the one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to determine whether
one distribution dominates the other.
H0 : F (x)−G(x) ≤ 0 for all x ; H1 : F (x)−G(x) > 0 for some x.
(4.5)
If this test cannot be rejected, the distribution F (x) dominates, and therefore
lies to the right of G(x).
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test compares the cumulative distribution functions
of the various variables calculated for each firm group separately. Plotted in a
graph, a distribution stochastically dominates the other one if it is located to the
right of that distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test calculates the maximum
vertical distance between two different distribution functions (D). If one distribu-
tion stochastically dominates the other significantly, this measure should be large
enough so that the distance between the two distributions cannot be explained by
random sampling error. However, with this simple test statistic, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test does not work properly, when the two distributions intersect. Hence,
a visual inspection of the graphs complements the analysis.
The test is applied to the standardized values of the variables (z-scores) to filter
out country, industry, and time specific effects that might vary between groups.
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4.6 Results
4.6.1 Deal characteristics
In this section, I start with a general overview of the M&A deals in the sample.
Table 4.3 provides a list of observations per firm group and country, tables 4.5 and
4.6 tabulate the industry distribution of acquirers, targets, and control firms, and
table 4.2 shows the distribution of deals over the period of observation.
Overall, the sample contains information on both sides of the deal for 482
cross-border deals and 2,288 national acquisitions. 58,843 firms are chosen as
control firms. Table 4.2 displays the number of cross-border and national deals
over time for the years 2001–2007.9 The period of observation covers the end of
the merger wave that had its peak in 2001 and includes the start of the latest merger
wave in 2006/2007 that was ended by the start of the financial crisis.
France and Germany are known to be among the top countries with respect to
the number of acquisitions. The numbers for the United Kingdom are unfortunately
too low (compare Brakman et al., 2007a). While in principle many British deals
are recorded for this country in Amadeus and Zephyr, the link between both sides
of the deal turns out to perform very poorly for this country. The main reason is
that British firms invest overseas much more frequently than acquirers in continen-
tal Europe. As only information on mergers within Europe is in the sample, those
deals are excluded. On average, there are four to five times more national deals per
country in the sample than cross-border acquisitions with the exception of Spain,
where the domestic merger market has been much more active, probably due to
deregulations in several industries. Table 4.4 lists the top ten of the country pairs
observed in the sample. The numbers illustrate nicely that most of the cross-border
acquisitions are observed in both directions between rather similar and close coun-
try pairs. Figure 4.1, finally, shows the distribution of cross-border deals that take
place between different Western European countries, between Eastern European
countries, and investments with participating firms from both broad regions. Most
deals involve only firms from western countries, some investments from western
countries in the Eastern European region can be observed, but the number of deals
in the other direction and between Eastern European firms is negligible. Cross-
border M&A is a business between firms of the largest, most developed countries.
9I restrict the analysis of the distribution of deals to the number of deals, as the
alternative measure in terms of deal values is not disclosed in many cases.
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The merger activity is not restricted to the manufacturing sector. The chemical
industry and manufacturing of food products are characterized by a high merger
activity, as well as there a many deals in the construction sector. But most fre-
quently, both national and domestic M&A occur in the computer business and in
other business related activities in the sample.
Theoretical models discriminate between horizontal and vertical investments.
The motivation for horizontal FDI is the duplication of the production process to
serve a foreign market in the spirit of Markusen (1984) and Brainard (1997). Ver-
tical investments shift parts of the production process abroad to take advantage of
cross-country cost differences (Helpman, 1984; Alfaro & Charlton, 2009). While
this differentiation is difficult to measure directly in empirical work, a frequently
used approximation of these two types of FDI are within- and cross-industry in-
vestments. Deals between firms that operate in the same two-digit NACE industry
are labeled as related deals and should capture horizontal investment motives. Ac-
quisitions of firms in different sectors are referred to as unrelated deals.
The share of related cross-border deals is on average 54.8%, and thus compa-
rable to the figures in Brakman et al. (2007b). Almost the same share of national
deals are investments in firms of the same industry (58.6%, compare figure 4.2).
Between the “old” European countries in the West and the Eastern European coun-
tries, there is still a pronounced differnce in production and in particular in labor
costs that could provide incentives for vertical investments. The share of both types
of deals is basically the same for deals between firms in Western Europe and deals
where Western European firms invest in the Eastern European countries (figure
4.3).
4.6.2 Performance ranking
The simple means of the different performance measures in levels are shown in
the upper panel of table 4.7, the lower part summarizes the corresponding z-scores.
Cross-border acquirers display the largest means of all variables in levels. The next
higher figures show up for national acquirers. Cross-border targets, in turn, have
slightly lower performance on average, but still larger than firms that are targeted
in national deals. The ranking is the same for the transformed values. However, the
absolute values of the means of the z-scores are smaller and the group means are
closer to each other as country, industry, and year effects are eliminated. The values
for the control firms are by definition close to zero with a standard error close to
one. Cross-border acquirers’ log sales, capital, and labor are on average around two
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and a half standard deviations away from the average control firm. The distance is
smaller for the other three measures, labor productivity, capital intensity, and the
TFP measure. Hence, firms engaged in either side of a national or cross-border
acquisition are much larger than control firms in the same industry. They are also
more productive, but their advantage is smaller in numbers of standard deviations.
Regarding the growth variables (table 4.8), unconditional on any firm charac-
teristics, the two groups of acquirers exhibit the strongest growth in size, where
national acquirers experience even higher rates compared to cross-border acquir-
ers. Interestingly, both groups of target firms show a reduction in their capital stock
and capital intensity in the pre-acquisition period. Surprisingly, target firms are the
only firms whose productivity levels increase. The z-scores of the growth variables
reveal that corrected for the country, industry, and year composition, both types of
acquirers grow more in size and productivity than the control sample and are rather
similar to each other. For cross-border targets, most values are close to zero or
negative. However, for both target groups, the mean TFP growth is positive, in the
case of national target firms even higher than for their acquirers. National targets
additionally experience a higher labor growth compared to non-merging firms.
To test the significance of the differences in means between groups, equation
4.2 is estimated. In addition to the three dummy variable sets for the firms’ country,
industry, and year, I include the age of the firm and a legal form dummy as further
control variables in the regressions. Table 4.9 lists the estimated coefficients in the
upper panel, the lower panel displays the test statistics and p-values for the t-tests
on equality of coefficients. A significant estimated coefficient in the upper panel
reveals a performance premium of the respective group compared to control firms.
A significant positive value of a test statistic in the lower panel, indicates a superior
performance of the group mentioned first in the respective row.
All types of firms display a significant higher performance level in each di-
mension compared to the reference group of non-merging firms. The size of the
coefficients reflect the ranking found in the simple means. The differences between
groups have all the expected direction and are significant in almost all cases. The
only two exceptions are national acquirers and cross-border targets that are similar
in terms of productivity. Cross-border and national targets further have about the
same TFP levels. Thus, larger and more productive firms select themselves into
both types of deals, with an additional premium for cross-border acquirers. But
target firms are also a positive selection from the remaining pool of firms. Ac-
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cording to the results so far, “high buys less high” would characterize the deals in
sample.
The results are less clear, when changes in the performance of firms are con-
sidered (table 4.10). The size measures of acquirers grow faster both compared to
control firms and also relative to the target firms. Targets experience a decrease in
capital intensity, but their productivity growth is significantly higher than for non-
merging firms. The two groups of targets exhibit similar changes in all variables,
and the growth rates of the two groups of acquirers are also not significantly differ-
ent from each other. Interestingly, in national deals, targets display a higher rate of
productivity growth than the corresponding group of national acquirers.
As the sorting pattern of acquirers and targets might depend on the underlying
characteristics of the M&A, I tried several sample splits. The results are largely
the same for manufacturing and service firms, and also for firms in the high-tech
and knowledge-intensive sector as opposed to low-tech and and less knowledge-
intensive industries. A split of the sample in the period before and after 2004,
the year when the new member states in the east of Europe joined the European
Union and the starting point for the recent increase in merger activities, also did not
provide any more insights. The productivity ranking across acquirers and targets
thus seems to be quite robust across industries.10
The results are also basically the same for related deals (table 4.11), while
cross-border and national targets do not differ in none of the performance measures
in unrelated acquisitions (table 4.12). The superior productivity growth of national
targets compared to national acquirers is found only in related deals. Targets in
unrelated deals further do not display a lower investment rate than control firms,
the lower capital growth is also driven by horizontal deals only (tables 4.13 and
4.14).
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of stochastic dominance extend the compar-
isons from the first moments of the performance measures to the comparison of
the complete distribution between firm groups. Table 4.15 and 4.16 show the re-
sults for the variables in levels. In table 4.17 and 4.17, differences in the growth
rates are tested. For each variable and firm group pair, two test statistics (D) and
the corresponding p-values are presented. The first lines shows the results for the
10Results for these variations are therefore not shown, but are available upon request.
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two-sided test on equality of distributions. If the null of identical distributions is
rejected, we look at the second, one-sided test on the stochastic dominance of one
distribution. If the null of stochastic dominance cannot be rejected, the ranking of
the two distributions is as indicated in the header of the respective column.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results confirm the ranking of distributions for
almost all variables and firm groups. For the performance measures in levels,
the only exceptions concern the comparison of targets, where the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test indicates superior TFP for firms with a future foreign ownership
change. For the differences in the groups’ growth rates, the main results are iden-
tical to the evidence found with the mean comparisons as well. The sales growth
distribution of cross-border targets dominates the distribution of national targets,
and national targets in turn outperform domestic firms, though the coefficients in
the t-tests were not significant. Finally, the difference between cross-border and
national acquirers’ TFP growth turns now out to be significantly positive.
As the ranking is rather similar for the three size and three productivity mea-
sures in levels, I draw the cumulative distribution functions for sales and labor
productivity only in figure 4.4. The upper left plot shows the clear ranking of the
sales distributions: cross-border acquirers, national acquirers, cross-border targets,
national targets, and domestic firms. The differences between the two types of ac-
quirers and the two groups of target firms become smaller, when the z-scores are
considered in the upper right plot. At the same time, the distance between acquirers
and targets becomes more pronounced. The lower two graphs show the same for
labor productivity. Though the distributions are very close to each other, the same
ranking can be observed.
All in all, the results so far are in line with previous work. Cross-border acquir-
ers are on average larger and more productive than target firms and those are again
better than domestic firms not involved in an acquisition even after correcting for
industry composition and year effects. The ranking of acquirers and target firms
also holds for national deals, but on a lower level. Some differences are observed
for related and cross-industry deals, overall, however, the ranking is rather robust.
Hence, both the selection of the best firms into acquisitions and the cherry-picking
of above-average targets are present in the European M&A deals of the sample.
With regard to differences in the acquirers’ and targets’ growth rates, the rank-
ing is less clear. Acquirers display the highest growth in the size measures. Targets
in both deals have on average lower net investments, which is also reflected in a
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relative decrease in capital intensity. In contrast, target firms seem to experience an
increase in their TFP measure one year before they are acquired, while acquirers
do not experience an above-average productivity growth.
4.6.3 Who buys who
In this subsection, I use the direct link between acquirer and target firms to analyze
acquirer-target performance differences to describe who buys who in domestic and
international acquisitions.
The upper panel of table 4.19 depicts several descriptive statistics of the ab-
solute difference between acquirers and targets with respect to the different per-
formance measures. The lower panel shows the same values using the difference
in z-scores. A positive value for the untransformed difference indicates that the
acquirer has an absolute performance advantage in direct comparison to its target
firm. A positive differences in z-scores indicates that the relative performance po-
sition of the acquirer within its industry is larger than the relative performance of
its target in numbers of standard deviations.
The first columns of table 4.19 reveal that the absolute difference between ac-
quirers and targets is positive on average for both types of deals and across all
performance measures. The performance edge is somewhat larger in cross-border
acquisitions. On average, the acquirer is one standard deviation further to the right
in the standardized size distribution compared to the firm’s future target. The dif-
ferences are smaller, but still positive, for the productivity measures. The medians
of the distributions of acquirer-target differences are also positive, and their values
are larger for cross-border acquisitions. More than half of the deals involve a larger
and more productive acquiring firm relative to its target.
Looking at the the 25th and 75th percentiles depicted in the remaining columns
helps to get a better feeling for the shape of the complete distributions. For the
absolute differences in the size variables, both the 25th and 75th percentiles are
positive, and larger for cross-border acquisitions compared to national deals. That
means that in at least three quarter of all deals, a larger acquirer and a smaller
target are involved. In fact, the previous result of “high buys less high” seems
to be confirmed. Acquirers are better than their targets, but as we have seen in
the previous section, targets are still above-average firms compared to the control
group of non-merging firms. All percentiles display a higher figure for cross-border
deals. That means that the performance premium is on average even higher for
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international acquisitions.
The distributions of the different productivity measures are closer to zero, as
the 25th percentiles are negative. There are more cases, in which a less productive
acquirer is involved, the majority of the deals, however, indeed implies a transfer
of resources to more efficient firms in absolute terms.
After the standardization, the means and medians of the distribution of size
differences in z-scores are still larger in international deals, but the figures are now
very close to the values for national deals. However, the spread of the distribu-
tion is larger for almost all performance measures, as the 25th percentile is lower,
but the 75th percentile is higher compared to the values of national deals. Also,
the standard deviation of the differences in z-scores are higher in the cross-border
sample.
Table 4.20 shows the descriptive statistics for the distance between acquirer
and target firms with respect to their performance growth. All in all, acquirers and
targets are similar in their absolute growth rates. Considering the differences in
z-scores, however, cross-border acquirers appear to have on average higher relative
growth rates than their targets. The only exception is TFP growth, where the me-
dian difference in z-scores is close to zero, but the average TFP growth difference
is negative. Only half of the deals are between acquirers with superior TFP growth,
while targets often display higher growth rates than their acquirers.
The distributions of absolute differences in growth rates for national deals is
rather similar to the findings for cross-border deals. However, even after standard-
ization, the growth rates of national acquirers and targets are very close to each
other. The only exceptions are that national acquirers seem to increase their capital
stock more than their future target firms. Similar to cross-border acquisitions, the
mean productivity difference in z-scores is also negative for national acquisitions.
To test whether the acquirer-target performance differences are significantly
larger for cross-border deals, I regress the calculated differences for each perfor-
mance measure on a dummy variable that takes the value one if the deal is an
international transaction. These regressions now contain two country and two in-
dustry dummy variable sets, one for acquirer and one for target firms, respectively.
The estimated coefficients are displayed in table 4.21. In the first row, we see that
for all measures, the performance differences in cross-border acquisitions are in-
deed larger compared to national deals. The larger differences mainly stem from
related deals (second row), while in acquisitions across industries, only the sales
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and labor productivity spread is larger for cross-border acquirers (third row). As
indicated in the descriptive statistics, the lower panel reveals no significantly larger
acquirer-target growth difference for international acquisitions.11
Figure 4.5 is illustrative at this point. The upper plots show the probability
density functions of the distribution of acquirer-target sales differences for the two
deal types. While the distribution of absolute differences for cross-border deals
seems to lie to the right of the line for national deals in the left plot, the picture
next to it draws the graphs for the differences in z-scores. After accounting for
industry and country effects, the peaks of the two distributions are very close to
each other. The acquirer-target differences are more heterogeneous in cross-border
acquisitions than for domestic deals. The distribution of national deals has a higher
peakedness, while at both sides the distribution for cross-border deals lies above the
graph of national deals. The lower two pictures plot the same two graphs for labor
productivity differences. Both distributions are closer around zero, however, there
are even more national deals in which firms of similar productivity participate.
Concluding, the results for the performance measures in levels suggest that
there is a positive performance difference for acquirers in both types of deals.
Hence, “high buys less high” is true with this respect. The performance distance is
larger for cross-border deals, in particular in related acquisitions within industries.
On the other hand, national acquirers and targets are more similar to each other
when performance changes are considered, which would argue for “like buys like”
as more characteristic for within country acquisitions. Despite the performance
advantage of acquirers on average and in many dimensions, the heterogeneity in
the match of acquirer and target firms is large.
4.7 Conclusion
Using a European firm-level dataset in combination with a global M&A database,
I analyze the complete sorting of acquirers and targets and compare the ranking
for national and cross-border acquisitions. I find the following sorting pattern:
11I do not perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on stochastic dominance in addition to
the t-tests, as the visual inspection of the data reveals that for almost all differences in
performance measures, the cumulative distributions functions of the two acquisition types
intersect. In such cases, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics are not meaningful.
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cross-border acquirers are on average larger and more productive than target firms
and those are again better than domestic firms not involved in any acquisition even
after correcting for industry composition and year effects. The ranking of acquirer
and target firms holds also for national deals, but on a lower level. The result is
robust across industries and type of deals. Thus, both firm selection into M&A
activity and cherry-picking of better than average targets hold simultaneously in
this dataset of acquisitions in the European Union.
Further, I discuss the distribution of the performance differences between ac-
quirers and their specific target firms. I find that the differences between acquirers
and targets are quite heterogeneous when I link the firms of each deal directly.
Using various performance measures, larger and more productive firms acquire
smaller firms. The distribution of acquirer-target differences is more concentrated
around zero for domestic deals, while size differences in cross-border M&As ap-
pear to be more heterogeneous and are also more often positive than in national
acquisitions. The results suggest that the question of who buys who is thus an-
swered best with “high buys less high” for cross-border acquisitions, while “like
buys like” is more typical for national deals. Although it seems to be more fre-
quent in international M&A deals that efficient firms pick less efficient, but above-
average performing targets, there is large heterogeneity in the matches of acquirer
and target firms.
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Table 4.4
Top ten country pairs of cross-border acquisitions.
Country pair Number of Percent
Acquirer Target cross-border deals of all deals
ES FR 22 4.92
FR ES 18 4.03
FR GB 18 4.03
BE FR 16 3.58
IT ES 16 3.58
IT FR 15 3.36
FR BE 14 3.13
FI EE 13 2.91
DE FR 11 2.46
FI NO 11 2.46
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Figure 4.1
Regional distribution of deals.
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Figure 4.2
Related and unrelated deals.
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Figure 4.3
Regional distribution of related and unrelated deals.
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Chapter 5
Cultural diversity and plant
productivity
5.1 Introduction
International migration has changed the cultural mix of the German population
as in many other European societies. Despite its rising importance, the effects of
migration on the economy of the host country are still discussed rather controver-
sially. The opening-up of the labor markets to immigrants from eight middle and
eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004 provided the
most recent example for the heated debate on potentially adverse effects of immi-
gration on employment and wages in the central European member countries. Both
the economic literature on migration and the public debate appear to be centered
around the impact of an increased presence of immigrants on economic outcomes
of the native population. Yet there is a second aspect of migration. Immigrants
do not form one homogeneous group, but they turn out to be rather diverse in their
cultures. Not only do they bring different languages, behaviors, and traditions from
their home country, they also add new sets of skills, knowledge, and experiences
to their host countries.
As a result, people from different nations interact more frequently with each
other in their communities and also at work. In the managerial literature, this
rise in (team) diversity is sometimes named a "double-edged sword" (Horwitz &
Horwitz, 2007). On the one hand, diversity creates difficulties that would otherwise
not be present. Misunderstandings due to language problems increase transaction
costs, incompatible expectations reduce productivity at least in the short run and
can even lead to team failure. But on the other hand, a diverse ethnic mix also
translates into a broader set of interests, perspectives, and abilities that give rise to
synergies if they are complementary to each other. Innovative solutions can result
from exchanging and combining existing with new ideas, with a positive effect on
innovation, business opportunities, and productivity (Lazear, 1999). The question
whether the benefits of diversity compensate the associated costs and thus whether
the diversification of a country’s population with respect to their nationalities has
a productivity increasing or a negative effect on productivity in the host country is
an empirical one.
We contribute to this discussion and estimate the effects of a culturally diverse
workforce on the productivity of German plants in an augmented production func-
tion framework. The innovative features of this research contribution are firstly,
that we look at the disaggregated level of establishments directly, and secondly,
that we try to separate the effects of the establishments’ own workforce on its
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productivity and regional spillover effects that result from the composition of the
workforce in the the plants’ region. Thirdly, we use System GMM methods to
control for the potential endogeneity of the diversity measures due to unobserved
influences and productivity shocks at the region-industry or plant level.
The impact of diversity on economic outcomes has been studied in various
fields as documented in the comprehensive survey of Alesina & Ferrara (2005).
They analyze how the effects of cultural diversity materialize at very different lev-
els or units of observation reaching from the country level to analyses of team
performance. A recently growing literature looks at regional effects of diversity.
Estimating wage and employment effects on natives, several papers try to assess
whether culturally diverse regions benefit from positive consumption and produc-
tion amenities or whether diversity has a negative impact on regional economic
performance (Glaeser et al., 2001; Ottoviano & Peri, 2005; Ottaviano & Peri, 2006;
Südekum et al., 2012). The productivity effects found at the region level might have
two different sources: via knowledge externalities that materialize at the regional
level or directly within the production process.
Our approach thus takes the analysis one step further as we try to distinguish
the two potential channels through which a plant’s observed productivity could be
influenced by a diverse workforce. First, we look at the composition of the work-
force of the plant itself, where native and non-native employees interact directly
within the unit of production. As Lazear (1999) points out, a necessary condition
for a positive effect is that the skill sets of the different group members do not
overlap completely. Ottaviano & Peri (2012) find small but positive imperfect sub-
stitutability between migrants and natives even within narrowly defined experience
and age cells, supporting the view that migrant workers bring new abilities to an
establishment.
While there are studies that find a positive effect of racial diversity on team
outcomes (for example Richard, 2000; Ellison et al., 2010; Watson et al., 1993),
Horwitz & Horwitz (2007) find no clear relation to team performance in a large
meta-study. Kahane et al. (2012) shows that teams of the National Hockey League
with a high share of foreign players perform better than homogeneous competitors,
but he finds that increasing diversity among the foreign members reduces the team
outcome due to increased language costs. At the firm level, Parrotta et al. (2010) do
not find a significant effect of diversity on firm productivity with Danish data when
they instrument the plant-level variables with their regional counterparts. Consid-
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ering innovation as an alternative measure for firm performance, Chellaraj et al.
(2008) find a positive effect of the presence of foreign graduate students on U.S.
universities’ patenting activities and Ozgen et al. (2011) show that a high share of
migrants slightly reduces innovative output, but diversity among migrants increases
product innovations of Dutch firms.
Second, we extend the analysis and test whether there is also a spillover effect
emerging at the regional level. We ask whether plants benefit from the charac-
teristics of the workforce in the region they are located in given the composition
of their own workforce. The mechanisms for efficiency gains might materialize
at the regional level if the interaction between people from different backgrounds
and resulting synergies generate knowledge spillovers. Similar to Moretti (2004),
who shows that firms in regions with a higher share of human capital benefit from
knowledge externalities, plants located in regions with a highly diversified work-
force might experience productivity increases. In fact, Audretsch et al. (2010) show
that technology-oriented start-ups are positively affected by regional diversity and
Niebuhr (2010) finds a positive effect on regional R&D in Germany.
With this research, we try to assess the impact of a culturally diverse workforce
within plants and regions estimating augmented production functions for a com-
prehensive sample of German establishments. The survey data is supplemented by
detailed administrative employee information that allows the construction of mea-
sures of the composition of the plants’ workforce as well as of the characteristics
of the regions’ workforce. We adopt an estimation framework similar to the esti-
mation of human capital spillovers as suggested in Moretti (2004) to test whether
there is an additional impact of cultural diversity at the regional level given the
plants own composition of its workforce. We extend the econometric strategy to
System GMM methods that allow controlling for the potential endogeneity of the
diversity measures within the plant and region in the estimation of the plants’ pro-
duction functions.
Overall, we find that the presence of non-native employees in a plant measured
as the share of foreigners of a plant’s own workforce has no significant impact
on the observed productivity of the plant on average. The diversity of the foreign
employees with respect to their nationalities, however, increases the total factor
productivity in German manufacturing plants, while it has no effect on plants in the
service sector. In addition, there is a positive spillover-like effect of the regional
diversification of the workforce. The positive impact of the regional workforce is
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mainly relevant for small plants in the service sector, and for plants in technology-
or knowledge-intensive industries. In several robustness checks we try to eliminate
alternative explanations for the diversity effect at the regional level, but the finding
remains unaffected by the inclusion of further regional characteristics.
We thus conclude that the productivity of German plants in our sample is pos-
itively affected by the composition of the plants’ own workforce and the composi-
tion of the working population of the region the plant is located in. Assessments of
the effects of international migration thus should not focus solely on the number of
foreign people that are part of an economy. In addition to the cultural enrichment
of a society, the diversity found among immigrants has a real positive impact on
the host economy that compensates potential costs. The effects seem to be larger
in environments in which potential communication barriers are smaller.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents the empirical strat-
egy. In section 5.3, the databases for the analysis are described, and section 5.4
explains the construction of variables. Section 5.5 shows the results, while the last
section concludes the chapter.
5.2 Estimation
To assess the impact of a culturally diverse labor force on the plant’s productiv-
ity, we estimate plant level production functions augmented with measures for the
composition of the workforce at the plant and regional level. The idea behind this
modeling approach is that if the diversity among the plants’ own workforce has a
net positive (negative) productivity effect, plants with workers from various cul-
tural backgrounds should be able to produce more (less) with the same amount of
inputs, controlling for other plant and worker characteristics. Similarly, if there are
positive (negative) externalities from the composition of the regional workforce,
we should observe a higher (lower) level of productivity of plants located in re-
gions with a higher degree of diversity compared to plants in regions with a less
diverse population, again controlling for the plants’ own labor force composition
and other regional characteristics.
The starting point is a log-linearized Cobb-Douglas specification with the plant’s
value added (V Ait) as the dependent variable, and physical capital (Kit) and hu-
man capital (Hit) as standard input factors for plant i in period t:
lnV Ait = α lnKit + α lnHit + lnAit. (5.1)
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We then assume the measures that account for the degree of cultural diversity
at the plant and regional level,Divit andDiv(−i)rt, respectively, to shift the plants’
log total factor productivity Ait in a linear way:
lnAit = θ1Divit + θ2Div(−i)rt + uit. (5.2)
The index (−i)rt indicates that we calculate the variables for region r exclud-
ing the ith plant’s own contribution to its region’s workforce in order to separate
the effects of diversity within the plant and at the regional level. The error term uit
may include a plant specific unobserved component in addition to the idiosyncratic
disturbance term.
We adopt a dynamic framework and include the lagged dependent variable
lnV Ai,t−1 as an additional regressor. Productivity levels of plants can be expected
to display significant persistence over time. Conditioning on the past output level
assures that we look at changes in the short run only, while the past evolution
of the plant is captured by the lagged output variable. This modeling strategy
helps to reduce the reverse causality problem that arises if more productive plants
choose to locate in diverse regions. The lagged dependent variable filters out those
past factors and helps to identify the short-run effect of diversity on output given
past performance. The final regression equation is the combination of the two
equations plus the one-period lagged value added and further control variables.
We include a vector of additional control variables Xit that are known to influence
the productivity of a plant, while Z(−i)rt contains further regional characteristics.
Finally, industry, region, and year dummies are included (dj , dr, and dt), such
that the remaining variation in the value added refers to within industry and within
region differences in a specific year.
lnV Ait = ρ lnV Ai,t−1 + α lnKit + α lnHit + θ1Divit + θ2Div(−i)rt
+ γXit + δZ(−i)rt + dj + dr + dt + uit. (5.3)
The main challenge in the estimation of the effects of the labor force compo-
sition on plants’ productivity is the potential bias that arises if unobserved factors
drive both the productivity of a plant and its decision to employ a more diverse
workforce. If plants with a positive productivity shock tend to hire people from
different nations more frequently than less productive competitors, the estimated
coefficient of the plant’s own diversity in the production function would be upward
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biased. In contrast to Moretti (2004), who focuses on regional spillover effects
alone and considers plant-level workforce characteristics as mere control variables,
we are interested in the effects within the plant as well. Therefore, we take into ac-
count both the potential endogeneity problem of the plants’ own inputs as well as
of the correlation of unobserved effects with the regional diversity measures.
We use System GMM methods following Blundell & Bond (1998, 2000) to
overcome the problems related to the estimation of such an augmented produc-
tion function. This estimator uses two equations simultaneously, equation 5.3 in
levels and in first differences, where endogenous and predetermined explanatory
variables are instrumented with their lagged differences and levels, respectively.1
We instrument all diversity measures at the plant and regional level in addition to
the lagged dependent variable and the plants’ physical and human capital.
This estimation strategy has several advantages compared to using panel fixed
effects methods. While the time-constant component of unobservable effects could
be eliminated using fixed effects estimation methods, productivity shocks that are
time-varying and unobservable for the researcher would cause both OLS and fixed
effects regression estimates to be biased. Furthermore, including the lagged depen-
dent variable as an explanatory variable in a model with plant fixed effects induces
an endogeneity problem by construction, known as dynamic panel bias as described
in Nickell (1981). In addition, as the capital measure is not directly observed, but
computed from reported investments and industry-level approximations, we expect
it to contain some measurement error, which fixed effects methods tend to reinforce
(van Biesebroeck, 2007). Finally, we model the presence of migrant workers with
their share of the total labor force. Using shares in fixed effects estimations in-
troduces systematical measurement error (compare Gerdes, 2011), that should be
less severe in System GMM estimation, where both within- and between-variation
contribute to the identification of the estimated parameters.
As this estimation strategy generates more instruments than endogenous re-
gressors, we can perform tests for overidentifying restrictions with the null hy-
pothesis of joint validity of all moment conditions. We report the Hansen J test
statistic as it is robust to heteroscedastic standard errors (Roodman, 2009). Unfor-
tunately, there is no reliable test routine for the problem of too many instruments
1We do not use difference-GMM as the value added variable appears to be highly
persistent making levels poor predictors of the first differences of the time series (Bond,
2002, compare).
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available. To be able to judge the quality of the test statistic, we report it together
with the number of instruments used. Further, we test for the appropriate auto-
correlation structure in the residuals of the first difference equation needed for the
lagged variables to be valid instruments (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Finally, we
implement Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for two-step covariance matrix
estimation, and adjust the standard errors in the regressions for clustering at the
region-industry level.
5.3 Data
To assess the impact of cultural diversity on the productivity of plants, we combine
the German Establishment History Panel (Betriebshistorik-Panel - BHP), which is
generated from the employment statistics by the Federal Employment Agency, with
the survey information from the IAB Establishment Panel (EP). Both datasets are
provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The information from
the BHP is linked to the EP via a unique common establishment identifier.
The IAB establishment panel is an annual survey of German plants collected
in personnel interviews (for more information, see Kölling, 2000). Drawn from
the population of all German plants with at least one employee subject to social
security, the sample is stratified across plant size and industries. Due to the way
of data collection, the unit of observation is the individual establishment. An es-
tablishment refers to the local unit of production as opposed to the concept of a
firm that could comprise several plants. Following Harris et al. (2005), the plant as
the lowest production unit is suited best for the estimation of productivity for sev-
eral reasons. Firms often operate plants in various industries, which would make it
difficult to control for industry-specific influences with industry dummy variables.
More importantly, the impact of regional characteristics would be diluted by firms
with plants in more than one region. Finally, the probability for actual interaction
between workers of different nationalities is higher within plants compared to a
geographically spread firm. The establishment panel provides a wide range of self-
reported plant variables, ranging from data on sales, investments, and employment
to exporting behavior and organizational characteristics. We take all necessary
plant-level information from the EP except for the details on the employed work-
force, as much more detailed information is provided in the administrative data of
the BHP (Hethey & Schmieder, 2010).
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The second data source, the BHP, is a 100% sample of all German establish-
ments employing at least one person subject to social security (thus excluding civil
servants and self-employed). Based on process data from the German Federal
Employment Agency, the BHP is highly reliable, and it comprises a comparably
rich set of variables. The data contains not only information on a plant’s loca-
tion (NUTS 3 regions), the industry in which the establishment operates (three-
digit NACE codes), but also a set of variables that describe the plants’ workforce:
gender, occupation and - most importantly for our analysis- the nationality of the
plants’ employees. The classification of foreign nationalities is very detailed with
around 180 different categories. The data is aggregated at the plant level to calcu-
late the diversity measures and further workforce characteristics. As the coverage
is universal, regionally aggregated variables generated from this data describe the
environment for each single plant most reliably, in particular with respect to the
variables that consider the nationality of the employees. The combination of the
data with the establishment panel allows us to control for regional characteristics
based on the BHP in the analysis of the establishments’ performance using the EP.
We focus on the period from 1999 to 2008, as from 1999 onwards the survey’s
definition of the plant population is consistent over time.2
The sample consists of manufacturing and services firms for which all neces-
sary information is available for at least three consecutive years to ensure the avail-
ability of appropriate lagged instruments. We only consider establishments that
are profit oriented; non-profit organizations, the public and the financial sectors are
excluded.3 We drop plants that switch between regions or change their reported
industry, and delete plants that insource other plants or units that are bought by
other firms to ensure consistency over time.
5.4 Variable definitions
In this section, we describe the construction of variables that we need for the esti-
mation of equation 5.3. Table 5.1 provides a list of all variables and more informa-
tion on the data used for each measure.
2From 1999 on, the data includes establishments with only minor employed persons.
3The following three digits NACE codes are excluded: 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 651, 652, 751,
752, 803, 950.
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5.4.1 Production function variables
The dependent variable is an establishment’s value added calculated from the plants
reported sales minus intermediate inputs. To measure the plants’ use of labor in-
puts, we calculate the average daily employment in full-time equivalents.4 As the
value of sales relates to an annual value, using full-time equivalents approximates
the necessary labor input for the yearly production output far better than the al-
ternative headcount as per period end, a measure that varies considerably over the
year due to seasonal effects. Using average daily employment also helps to control
for part-time workers.
To account for differences in the plants’ human capital, we differentiate be-
tween highly skilled and less skilled employees. Skilled labor input is often ap-
proximated by employees holding a university degree. While this information is
available in our data, we prefer to use a more comprehensive measure that takes
into account assigned tasks of different occupations. For a practical reason, the
traditional skill measure is frequently not reported and we would lose more than
half of the final observations that do contain information on occupations. Further,
high skilled people do not necessarily work in occupations that typically ask for
a university degree and there are also many employees without higher education
that work in occupations that typically do ask for a degree (Brunow & Hirte, 2009).
This problem can be expected to be even more severe comparing native and foreign
employees, as the different degrees might be less comparable across nations. Peri
& Sparber (2009) and D’Amuri & Peri (2010) also show that within education cat-
egories, natives and non-natives specialize in different tasks for which they have a
comparative advantage. We take the data on occupations from the 1998/99 German
Qualification and Career Survey conducted by the Federal Institute for Vocational
Education and Training (BIBB) and the Institute for Employment (IAB). Based
on the share of analytical work and the share of non-routine tasks relative to total
working time in addition to the average share of people holding a university degree
that characterize each occupation, we classify occupations into a high skilled and
4The BHP reports the number of employees in three categories: working full-time,
large, and small part-time. A full-time equivalent is then estimated using the weights 1,
0.6, and 0.3 for the different categories, respectively. The weighting is necessary, because
no information on hours worked is provided.
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less skilled group using hierarchical cluster analysis.5,6
As many comparable establishment-level datasets, the EP does not contain a
direct measure of the capital stock. There is information available on the plants’
total investments, the share of net investments, and dummies for four categories
of investment types (real estate, IT, production machinery, and transport equip-
ment). We apply the modified perpetual inventory method developed explicitly for
this dataset by Müller (2008). Due to the rather short panel dimension, a starting
value for the capital stock is computed based on a proportionality assumption us-
ing industry specific information on average economic lives of different types of
equipment and average investments in the first three observed years. Based on this
starting value, a perpetual inventory approach is used to generate the capital stock
for each year.
5.4.2 Diversity measures
The main variables of interest are the diversity of the plants’ and regions’ work-
force with respect to foreign nationalities. To measure the effect of a culturally
diverse workforce, we use two variables. The share of employed foreigners in the
total workforce sforit captures the size of the group of foreign employees. The diver-
sification of the foreign workforce is measured with a Herfindahl-Hirschman type
index that reflects the distribution of nationalities among the foreign employees:
divforit = 1−
Mit∑
m=1
s2mit . (5.4)
smit is the share of workers of nation m in the total number of foreign workers
employed at plant i at time t, m = 1, . . . ,Mit, and Mit is the absolute number
of nations within the respective plant. Note that divforit equals zero for plants that
employ persons from one single foreign nation, as well as for plants that employ
natives only. The index rises with the number of different nationalities employed
at a plant. For a given Mit, the measure is higher the more uniformly distributed
5The proportion of employees with a university degree is taken from the BHP data
base.
6Given the identical continuous scale of the three variables we choose the Euclidean
distance to measure similarities between occupations. The results used are based on a
complete linkage, where the furthest distance of objects within two clusters is used to
merge objects and clusters. Other methods lead to qualitatively similar clusters.
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the shares smit are, and it reaches its maximum if the same number of employees
from each nation is employed in a plant at divforit = 1− 1/Mit.7
Two reasons let us choose this operationalization of cultural diversity with two
separate variables. While the main interest lies on the diversity index, the share of
foreign employees is included to capture the level effect of the presence of foreign
employees. We want to stress that the composition of the group of migrants is a
second, separate dimension of migration that is often neglected in studies on the
effects of immigration. There is a second, more technical aspect. Alternatively, we
could construct a diversity measure including the share of natives. However, the
resulting index over all nations turns out to be completely dominated by the share
of German labor input leaving almost no variation across time, regions, and plants
for identification. It has to be kept in mind that the estimated effects of diversity
can only be interpreted conditional on the share of foreign employees.
As a proxy for the cultural background of an employee, we use the employees’
nationality as in Südekum et al. (2012). One potential drawback of the diversity
measure is that only the actual, recorded nationality is reported in the IAB data.
Neither the country of birth, nor the naturalization of migrants is documented in
official statistics in Germany. When immigrants change their nationality, our mea-
sure would underestimate the degree of diversity. The same would be true for
second-generation immigrants that have German citizenship but define themselves
in terms of their parents’ culture. As information on the time since migration or
language skills is also lacking, we could also overestimate diversity, as the cultural
differences might diminish and language skills improve with the time a foreign
worker is living in Germany. While one should keep in mind these limitations, it
has to be clear that this type of information would only be available in survey data.
The construction of variables at the regional level, however, hinges on the availabil-
ity of information on the universe of the workforce only available in administrative
data.
7There are several ways discussed in the literature to control for diversity. We use the
traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Other measures are discussed by Combes et al.
(2004) and Ottoviano & Peri (2005) and lead to similar results.
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5.4.3 Control variables
With regard to the control variables included in the regression analysis, we consider
additional measures that characterize the plants’ workforce such as the share of
female employees and the share of part-time work.8
The next set of variables refers to plant-level characteristics that are known to
influence productivity significantly. Exporting plants are relatively more produc-
tive than their domestic competitors as they have to incur entry costs in the foreign
market (Melitz, 2003; Wagner, 2007). Similarly, foreign-owned firms typically dis-
play a higher efficiency level (Conyon et al., 2002b). We include an age dummy
for young firms and control both for the legal form and for plants that are part of
a larger corporate group. We further use a question about the current state of the
technology and machinery (state-of-art versus out of date) to control for qualitative
differences of the plants’ technical equipment.
To capture the impact of the regional workforce on the plants’ productivity,
we calculate further control variables at the NUTS 3 level. As described above,
we always exclude the individual plant under consideration in the calculation to
avoid endogeneity and multicollinearity problems. We use region size in terms of
total employment to account for urbanization effects.9 Large areas typically offer
better job opportunities making immigration more likely. An omission of such a
measure would overestimate regional diversity effects. Additionally, we control
for the stock of human capital in the plant’s location.10 Further regional control
variables such as industrial diversity are considered in robustness checks.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Before we present the regression results, we discuss the characteristics of the es-
timation sample displayed in table 5.2. Overall, the average share of foreign em-
8We do already control for part-time work in the full-time equivalents to define the vol-
ume of labor, but there might be a loss in overall productivity when the average proportion
of part-time work increases.
9We also experimented with the regions density and other regional characteristics with-
out changing the main results.
10The construction of regional variables is only reliable from the universe of adminis-
trative data. We are not able to construct regional capital stock variable from the survey
data as a further regional control variable.
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ployees working in plants included in the estimation sample is 3.6%. The share
rises to 10.8% for plants with a positive share of foreigners.11 The proportion of
foreigners across all plants is rather constant over the sample period and the num-
ber is almost the same for manufacturing and service plants. The share of foreign
workers is higher among less skilled workers in both sectors, but service plants
employ relatively more high skilled migrants compared to manufacturing plants.
Further, larger plants and those that are located in agglomerated regions employ a
higher proportion of foreign workers than their smaller competitors and plants in
more rural areas, respectively. Regional differences are pronounced with a share
of foreigners of 6.7% in western plants, compared to only 0.5% in plants located
in the former Eastern German regions, a fact that is driven by the lower general
presence of migrants in Eastern Germany.
The second dimension of cultural diversity is the distribution of different na-
tionalities among the foreign workers. The diversity index is on average 0.16 for
all plants, and 0.41 for plants with at least one foreign employee. Diversity among
less skilled migrants is higher than among high skilled workers, and manufacturing
plants employ a more diverse mix of foreign workers. Again, the numbers are much
higher on average for western plants than for their East German counterparts (0.45
versus 0.18), and also for larger plants and plants located in large, agglomerated
regions.
Turning to the region level, the average share of foreigners in the regional
workforce is 5.6% and the diversity index has a mean of 0.86. The proportion
of foreign workers among the less skilled workforce is 8.1% compared to 2.7%
among the high skilled employees. As indicated earlier, there is a large difference
between the Western and Eastern German states, where we observe both a higher
share and more diverse foreign workers in the Western states (the share is 7.0%
versus 0.7%, respectively). The regions with the highest proportion of foreigners
are the metropolitan areas around Munich, Stuttgart and Frankfurt, as well as in
the Rhine-Ruhr area. The diversity index varies considerably and takes on values
between 0.30 and 0.97, where typical university towns, such as in Trier or Jena,
have the most diverse workforce. The traditional guest worker regions, in contrast,
display the lowest diversity values due to the strong presence of employees from
11We also do observe a small number of plants that have a share of foreigners equal to
one, which are very small plants mainly in restaurants and retail sale business.
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former guest worker countries, such as Turkey or Greece, that dominate the distri-
bution of nationalities. The diversity index at the regional level separated by skill
group takes slightly higher values for high skilled foreign employees.
Economically strong and agglomerated regions should attract more migrants
than smaller regions as they provide more job opportunities. The proportion of
foreign workers is thus expected to be higher in larger and richer regions. The cor-
relation between region size and diversity is less clear ex ante. Again, prosperous
regions attract migrants from many countries increasing the mix of nationalities.
But the literature also describes a network effect, according to which new migrants
tend to settle in regions where other members of their home country already live
Bartel (1989). If, historically, a certain migrant group is more present in an agglom-
eration, such as from the Southern European countries or Turkey in the Rhein-Ruhr
area, this region further attracts immigrants from the same country of origin, which
would imply a decrease in diversity. The two panels of figure 1 show the correla-
tion of the regions’ share of foreign employees and the diversity index with the
log region size, respectively. While the proportion of foreigners in the population
clearly rises with the total size of a region, there is no significant relation to the
regions’ diversity index.
The focus of the following analysis is the separation of the effect of diversity
at the region and plant level. Table 5.3 displays the matrix of pairwise correla-
tion coefficients for the respective variables. The correlation coefficient between
the plant and region share of foreign workers is positive, that is, plants in regions
with more migrants tend to employ more foreign workers not controlling for any
other characteristics. But it is interesting to note that the correlation between the
diversity index measured at the plant and region level is negative, which indicates
the importance to separate the effects of a diverse workforce within a plant from
spillover effects stemming from the regional composition of the workforce.
Further, we measure diversity with two separate variables, the ratio of foreign
labor input to total employment and the diversification among the foreign work-
force. The correlation between the share of foreigners and the diversity index is
positive at the plant level, but negative at the regional level. Plants that employ
many non-natives also tend to have a more diverse workforce. Regions where many
foreign employees live, in contrast, are not necessarily diverse with respect to the
nationalities of the migrants. In fact, the two measures capture distinct dimensions
of migration.
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5.5.2 Main results
We now discuss the estimation results. Table 5.4 presents the results for the pro-
duction function estimation using different estimation strategies. The estimation
is carried out separately by the two broad sectors manufacturing and services. Fo-
cusing on the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, OLS results in the first
columns are highest, fixed effects estimations give the lowest values displayed in
the second columns, while the coefficient obtained in the System GMM estima-
tion depicted in the last column is in the middle of the two estimates. This is in
line with theoretical considerations, where OLS estimates of the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable in the presence of plant fixed effects are upward biased,
and fixed effect estimation leads to downward biased estimates (Roodman, 2009).
The Hansen J test does not reject the null of joint validity of all instruments. The
test on autocorrelation in the residuals of the equation in first differences cannot
reject the null of no autocorrelation of second order, which means that there is no
autocorrelation of first order in the level equation aside from the plant fixed effect.
As our System GMM estimates lie in the predicted range and the test statistics sup-
port the dynamic specification and appropriate instrumentation of the endogenous
variables, we are confident that we have a robust specification of the production
function.12
Briefly looking at the standard control variables, their coefficients turn out to
have the expected signs as well: plants with newer technology produce more effi-
ciently, single plants are less productive than plants that are part of a larger group,
and foreign ownership as well as exporting activity are both associated with higher
productivity at least in the manufacturing sample. The share of females and part-
time work are measures that characterize the plants’ human capital in more detail.
The negative coefficient of the proportion of females working in a plant can be ex-
plained with an on average reduced number of working hours of female employees
even after controlling for the broader categories part-time and full-time employ-
ment. In the service sector, plants with a higher share of part-time work might be
12A minor issue is the insignificant coefficient estimate of the capital measure in the
manufacturing sample. The capital measure is an approximation calculated from invest-
ment figures and a constructed starting value. The instrumentation with lags in the
System GMM estimation takes into account potential measurement error that seems to
be present in the constructed capital measure. Nevertheless it is important to control
for capital as an input factor to get reliable estimates for the remaining measures of the
plants’ inputs.
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able to respond more flexibly to short-term demand variations.
Turning to the regional control variables, the log size of the plants’ region in
terms of the total number of employees captures agglomeration effects. We also
add a regional measure for human capital in the spirit of Moretti (2004) as the re-
gional share of skilled workers could confound the effect of diversity at the regional
level if diversity varies systematically with the skill share. In the manufacturing
sample, plants located in larger regions in terms of the workforce appear to be
more productive, a result in line with Andersson & Lööf (2011) who find the same
effect for Swedish manufacturing plants. However, the region size is no longer
significant with the introduction of the additional regional control variables. In the
service sector, both the size of the region and the regional share of human capital
are statistically insignificant in the estimation of the plants’ productivity. As these
results remain basically unaffected from the sequent introduction of the variables
of interest, we suppress them in the following tables for the sake of brevity.13
We now look at the main variables of interest that measure the cultural di-
versity among the plants’ workforce and in the region of the plant, namely the
share of foreign employees and the diversity index among those foreign workers.
At the plant level, the coefficient of the share of foreigners in the manufacturing
plants’ own workforce is negative, but the coefficient is insignificant in the esti-
mation. However, we see a statistically significant, positive coefficient of diver-
sity among the foreign employees on manufacturing plants’ observed total factor
productivity. To get a feeling for the economic significance of this effect in the
semi-log specification, we calculate the productivity change implied by a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the plants’ diversity index. The resulting increase of
9.7% (=(exp(0.310)*0.300)-1*100%) seems to be reasonable as it lies between the
productivity advantage of having the newest technology (6.8%) and having a for-
eign owner (15.7%). In the service sector, the diversity index appears to have an
insignificant impact on the plants’ productivity.
Turning to the regional level, the regional share of foreigners is also not sig-
nificant in the estimation. The regions’ diversity index has a significant and large
coefficient, however. If the regional diversity index rose by one standard devia-
tion in the manufacturing sample holding constant the share of foreign workers,
the observed productivity of an average plant would thus rise by around 11.4%
13The full sets of results are available upon request.
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(=(exp(1.617*0.067)-1) *100%) given its own composition of the workforce. At
the regional level, the presence of foreigners, the proportion of skilled employees,
and the size of the region is positively correlated so that it is hard to separate the
effects on plant productivity from each other. It has to be clear, though, that the
effect of a diverse population can only be interpreted conditional on the share of
foreigners present at the plant or region.
Summing up, we find that cultural diversity matters for plant performance. The
size of the group of foreign workers, in contrast, does not have an effect on plant
productivity. We find two channels for the impact of diversity on productivity. The
composition of the plant’s own workforce shows up for manufacturing plant, but
plants from both sectors benefit from their location in a culturally diverse region,
and this effect is economically at least as important as the effect within the plant.
One possible explanation for the results could be that communication difficul-
ties are more problematic in the service sector that is characterized by a closer
and more direct customer interaction than in manufacturing. In manufacturing
firms, the positive effect of complementarities of skills and knowledge of the di-
verse workforce seems to dominate. In addition, manufacturing firms might have
different innovation behavior than service firms. There is evidence that service
firms are more dependent on inter-firm co-operations, while manufacturing firms
are often seen as "true innovators" that innovate within their own firm boundaries
(Tether, 2005). Niebuhr (2010) shows how cultural diversity is related to innova-
tion at the regional level in Germany via the combination of new ideas and problem
solving abilities. Taken together, these pieces of evidence help to understand the
differences across sectors found in our results. Another way to support this line of
reasoning is to look at high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries, for which the
effect of diversity should be particularly pronounced. Indeed, the first two columns
in table 5.5 show that the effect at the regional level stems from the part of the
sample that belongs to these technology-intensive industries.14
14A finer sector definition according to Eurostat in high-tech and low-tech manufacturing
and knowledge intensive and other services did not give any significant results supposedly
because of the reduced sizes of the subsamples.
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5.5.3 Effect heterogeneity
If we really measure a spillover-like effect of diversity, the effect of the regional
diversity on single plants can be expected to be more pronounced than for plants
that are part of a group, as for the relation between regional characteristics and
plant outcome should be more direct for single plants. In fact, the results are mainly
driven by the subsamples of single plants (compare table 5.6). As the sample sizes
are reduced by this additional sample split, the regressions for plants that are part
of a larger corporate group should be interpreted with care, however, as the test
statistics point to problems with the instrumentation of the endogenous variables
(p-values of the Hansen J test is exactly 1).
Another explanation that goes into a similar direction can be derived from the
separate estimations for large and small plants. The positive coefficient within
the plant pops up within larger manufacturing plants that benefit from their own
diverse workforce, but there is no spillover effect from the regional workforce.
For smaller service plants, in contrast, the results suggest the opposite: they are
stimulated by a diverse environment, and the coefficient is much larger compared
to the pooled sample results. Note that there is a slightly significant negative effect
of the presence of foreign workers in small service plants. Again, one reason could
be that the communication costs in customer-oriented service plants without the
organizational structure of larger plants are most severe. As service plants in the
sample are on average smaller than manufacturing plants, this result partly explains
the sectoral differences (table 5.7).
Another channel for the positive impact of diversity on plant productivity could
be via the plants’ exporting behavior. Plants with employees from various na-
tions might find it easier to enter foreign markets and to build up distribution net-
works in various countries. Foreign employees possess special knowledge about
the export destination country, they know not only the language, but also tastes,
habits, and laws, information that might be crucial to be a successful exporting
plant. Therefore, we re-estimate the same equation separately for exporters and
non-exporters in table 5.8. Interestingly, the share of foreign workers now turns
out to be negatively related to non-exporting plants’ productivity. The benefits of
foreign employees thus seem to be larger for exporters, while the costs associ-
ated with workers from other nations appear to be more dominant in the rest of
the plants. A different explanation might be that exporters might have a common
working language within the plant anyway due to their international engagement,
making communication between native and non-native employees more efficient.
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Further, the impact of the regional composition of the workforce shows up only
for the non-exporter sample. Exporters seem to be less dependent on their region’s
characteristics as they operate on more than one market. In contrast to this result,
the impact of regional diversity is the same for foreign-owned and domestic plants.
The effect on the foreign-owned plants is in fact higher. Again, the test statistics in
this estimation are less satisfactory (table 5.8).
Finally, we try to assess regional differences in our findings. Table 5.9 shows
the results of separate estimations for different types of regions. The effect of
regional diversity reveals a surprising pattern: the coefficient is very small for
agglomerated regions, and larger and significant only for less urbanized regions.
Further, we separate the sample into plants located in larger and smaller regions
with respect to the region size. Again, the effect at the regional level seems to be
driven mainly by plants in smaller regions, while there is no spillover effect from
a diverse workforce in larger regions.15 One explanation for this somewhat sur-
prising finding could be that in larger, agglomerated regions, there is already quite
a diverse population with regard to their background, experiences, and skills irre-
spective of whether migrants are present or not. In less densely populated regions,
on the other hand, diverse migrants really add new knowledge and abilities to the
available pool resulting in an increase of the regions’ and plants’ productivity. An-
other way to look at the results is that smaller plants are more frequently located in
rural areas and thus the differences in the effects across regions is the consequence
of the different composition of plants.
5.5.4 Robustness checks
One might wonder whether the regional diversity effect captures other urbaniza-
tion effects than effects related to cultural diversity. Migrants are not distributed
evenly or randomly across the country, but they self-elect into particular regions.
It has to be clear, however, that we do already control for regional size that should
absorb all effects related to the size of the region in addition to region and industry
fixed effects that take into account time-invariant regional differences. Addition-
ally, the lagged value of plant’s value added ensures that only short-term effects
15The following variations did not result in significant coefficient estimates: A separate
estimation for three regional types (agglomerations, urban and rural areas), the introduc-
tion of interaction terms of the region size or region density with the diversity measures.
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are estimated while general level effects or reverse causality issues are controlled
for. Finally, the remaining potential endogeneity of the diversity measures is taken
into account as we instrument both the regional and plant diversity variables. Still,
GMM results could suffer from weak and too many instruments. Therefore, we try
to exclude alternative explanations for the effects found using more control vari-
ables and alternative estimation strategies. As additional region characteristics we
include regional density, the number of plants in the region, the number of plants in
the industry and region, and the industrial diversity of the plants across industries.
All of these variations do not change the estimated effects of cultural diversity of
the regional workforce (table 5.10).
A major problem could be that the diversity measure partly captures industry-
specific productivity shocks that are not absorbed by industry fixed effects. If di-
versity increases as migrants are attracted to certain industries and regions that
experience a positive productivity shock, our results could be spurious. To check
this possibility, we follow Moretti (2004) and calculate the regional diversity mea-
sure excluding not only the plants’ own contribution in the calculation of the re-
gional variables, but we subtract the contribution of the plants’ own industry in the
regional diversity measures. The results are basically the same, but the level of sig-
nificance decreases. While part of the effect might be industry-specific, this result
gives even more confidence in the chosen IV framework, as potential unobserved
industry productivity shocks seem not do drive our results (compare table 5.11).16
Diversity could matter more within skill groups as the interaction between the
members of the groups is more direct. If the positive effect of diversity is due to in-
creased problem solving abilities, the effect can be expected to show up for the high
skilled group that is defined by occupations with a high share of analytical, non-
routine tasks. In addition, better educated people might have less communication
problems. Therefore, we calculate the results for the diversity measures separated
by skill. Table 5.12 reveals that no coefficient is now significantly different from
zero. As the estimation is very data demanding already by including many control
variables and various fixed effects, it is not possible to identify significant separate
effects. We thus do not further pursue the estimation of separate effects by skill
groups.
16One could also try to assess the effect of diversity within the plants own industry
excluding the plants contribution. However, at this level of regional disaggregation, there
are often too few plants per industry that the calculation of an average remains meaningful.
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One concern might be that not only the skill structure might be different for
plants with more foreign workers, but that the observed effect of diversity might
stem from differences in the mix of occupations in the plants. Peri & Sparber
(2009) and D’Amuri & Peri (2010) suggest that migrants tend to chose occupations
where they have a competitive advantage over natives, and migrant concentration
varies between industries and firms (Andersson et al., 2010). The occupational
diversity index among foreigners is also much smaller in our sample than the index
for native workers. We thus include an occupational diversity index and in another
variation separate indices of occupational diversity among native and non-native
employees in the estimation equation. The results are insignificant for the new
variables and the main results are mainly unchanged. The sorting of migrants into
specific occupations and resulting productivity gains do not drive primarily our
findings (table 5.13).
When sales are used as the dependent variable instead of value added (first
columns in table 5.14) or with intermediates as an additional input factor and sales
as the dependent variable (last columns in table 5.14), the direction of the effects
remains largely the same. In this specification, sales seem to be more correlated
over time, the lagged dependent variable captures more of the variation leaving the
other input coefficients with lower coefficients, and also the size of the regional
effect is smaller. Robustness checks using information on the employees’ high
school degree generate similar results, but the coefficients lose their significance.
This is mainly due to the loss of more than half of the observations as this variable
is frequently not reported in the data in contrast to the occupational information
(table 5.15).
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the impact of a culturally diverse workforce within plants
and regions on plant productivity for a comprehensive sample of German establish-
ments. Using System-GMM methods to estimate plant-level production functions
augmented with regional information we control for the potential endogeneity of
the diversity measures within the plant and region.
We find that the presence of non-native employees in a plant has no significant
impact on the observed productivity of the plant on average. The diversity of the
foreign employees with respect to their nationalities, however, increases the total
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factor productivity in German manufacturing plants, while it has no effect on plants
in the service sector.
In addition, there is a positive spillover effect stemming from the regional di-
versification of the workforce. The positive impact of the regional workforce is
mainly driven by small plants in the service sector, and also shows up for plants in
technology- or knowledge-intensive industries. The number of foreign employees
in a region does not have a significant impact on plant productivity, however. The
estimated effects survive a series of robustness checks in which we try to eliminate
alternative explanations for the diversity effect at the regional level.
The policy debate and also the larger part of the migration literature focuses
on the absolute number of migrants, while the cultural diversity among migrants
as the second dimension of international migration is often not taken into account.
The composition of the plants’ own workforce and the composition of the work-
ing population of the region the plant is located in have a real positive effect on
productivity of German plants in our sample.
We extend the research that finds positive diversity effects on regional pro-
ductivity as we provide evidence on two different channels through which the ob-
served effects arise. Part of the effect has its origin within the plants, but at least as
important are knowledge externalities at the region level that improve the plants’
efficiency.
The costs that are usually associated with a diverse workforce seem to be out-
weighed by the synergies that are created when different and new skills and abili-
ties are combined. Interestingly, this productivity effect does not arise clearly from
interactions within skill groups. Whether cultural diversity within a plant can en-
fold its positive impact rather seems to depend on the business environment in the
plant. In large, exporting, manufacturing plants, English is usually the business
lingua franca, which reduces potential disadvantages of migrants and the positive
effect of diversity is observed. For other plants to be able to benefit the most from
international diversity, it might be helpful to eliminate existing language barriers
to reduce communication costs.
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Figure 5.1
Region diversity and log region size.
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